On Corporate Aesthetics and Post-Internet Art

Of all things I’ve seen on the internet lately, I can’t recall any image being so aesthetically pleasing as Julia Fox posing as a real estate agent on a billboard  in Manhattan. This was not because of its situationist appearance, plastered without context to the side of a vape shop on Mott Street, but for the uncanny feeling induced by her clean face framed by corporate-style typographies and logos. Her traits, previously adapted to countless It Girl styles, conform now with a glowy Office Siren look: infused by a frontal white light, framed by a formal blue suit. Spotting a recognizable face where you’d expect to find an unfamiliar stock-image face is paradoxical: stock imagery is made to feel generic, to evoke a popularly shared feeling. But NEON, the marketing team fresh off iconic campaigns for Longlegs and Anora, capture our current obsession for corporate aesthetics in visual culture for Stephen Soderbergh’s Presence in a way that transcends a catchy troll campaign. From PowerPoint slides and muted blue and gray palettes to office uniforms, slogans and business infographics, the internet is currently being flooded with variations of early late 90s/2000s corporate visual elements and stock imagery aesthetics. But why is this happening now?

Julia Fox posing as a real estate agent in a billboard spawned in Manhattan

Single Cover for EQ’s Boytoy. Credits: @estratosfera___

In the 2010s wave of post-internet art, corporate aesthetics were of extreme interest for artists investigating what the internet had become in so little time. Following the brief illusion of the online as an open and free space. The internet, on the cusp of the ‘10s, was facing two possible directions: that of a free zone independent from corporate capitalism, and that of a space owned by a few companies monopolizing online life. Post-internet artists were extremely sensitive to these signs. In 2013 DIS Magazine, a collaborative project between a group of artists and theorists including Lauren Boyle, Solomon Chase, Marco Roso and David Toro, affiliated with other artists like Brad Troemel, Ryan Trecartin and Ian Cheng, launched DISimages, a call to action for artists to create their own series of stock images. Dedicated to “manipulating the codes and trends in stock photography,” DISimages invited artists to create new unexpected compositions that broadened the spectrum of stereotypical stock portraiture. In Mer-life, DIS itself shot a bunch of lifestyle vignettes of people performing casual actions — drinking a Starbucks coffee, fixing a hole in the wall, writing on a laptop — while wearing a mermaid tail. In another series called Future Growth Approximation, Estonian artist Katja Novitskova situated cut outs of animals and stock arrows in white cubes as indicators of economic growth, while Anne de Vries mixed objects of different textures in dadaist compositions, somehow similar to the haptic nature of some AI-images that flood Instagram’s Explore page.

Mer-Life, DIS

Future Growth Approximation, Katja Novitskova

All these pictures were — and are — up for sale on the DIS official website for whoever wants to use them. In the spirit of DISimages, the socially constructed patterns in advertising can be revolutionized by scattering touches of strangeness here and there. With the goal of appealing to the broadest possible market, stock imagery “sanitizes” humanity to the lowest common denominator, packaging what’s only a faded impression of daily human rituals. Because it’s impossible to stage any “risky” variation, it’s often very easy to trace the biases behind these portrayals. Women in their early 30s will be the only ones laughing at their salads, software developers will wear thick glasses and hardly ever look Caucasian, and so on. There’s an uncanny feeling in being able to track which elements originate from which beliefs, an uncanniness resonant within a lot of AI generated imagery. In this sense, DISimages’ attempt to sow chaos feels like an experimental machine learning model being trained on a bespoke database of weird images. Theorist Silvio Lorusso, author of Enterprecariat and What Design Can’t Do, coined the term “Normie Weird” to refer to a certain kind of weirdness pursued by people experimenting with GANs. The images generated by AIs “are weird, sure, but normie-weird” he writes, “they are what you would expect a weird image to look like. Somehow, they reassure us of our notion of weirdness. When everything is weird, nothing truly is.”

The role of stock pictures in the market has been replaced by AI-generated images. You can spot them in the streets and in store windows more and more, retaining a certain strangeness made up of smiles far too white, skins too smooth, unhuman expressions and unnatural colors. Post-internet artist and DIS magazine contributor Daniel Keller calls the increasingly lighthearted incorporation of this kind of aesthetic into everyday life “sloptimism” a tongue-in-cheek repositioning of the content poured for us into the feed. Keller’s term has its roots in other theories like the Dark Forest and the Dead Internet: both basically stating that the online world is a wasteland of bots and AI-generated content, where human gestures have nearly disappeared or driven away by the fear of algorithmic echo chambers. What Keller has observed is that, in the times of attention economy, the rules of advertising have bled into all other aspects of life. He sees sloptimism as the symptom of culture and corporate collapsing into each other. This draws a sharp connection between this era and the one in which early post-internet artists, including him, first operated.

In 2008, Kevin Bewersdorf, co-creator of Spirit Surfers – one of the most popular surf clubs of the early web — inaugurated Maximum Sorrow, a personalised corporate identity, complete with its own website, logo, merch and uniform. The idea for it came from the same experience of web surfing: the practice of blogging about internet ephemera that spread around post-internet artists just before the launch of Web 2.0. In an interview with Rhizome.org, the artist stated that he came up with the idea for the website after seeing how these artists were progressively mastering self-branding practices online. “Many net artists may not be willing to admit it, but what they are really trying to do is to build an empire, to be a brand that offers it all. There is an absurdity to that. Having your own website is like building an unnecessary shrine to yourself. […] I use my signature and various logos to point out the absurdity of this vanity. […] Whether a net artist brands themself with a sparse list of links […] or with logos in a bland grid, they are constructing their own web persona for all to see” he says.

Kevin Bewersdorf’s Maximum Sorrow (2008-2009)

Maximum Sorrow tapped into what Kevin called “corporate spiritualism”, a philosophy he materialized in two projects: an image and text based work called Stock Photography Watermarks As the Presence of God, where he imagines watermarks on stock pictures as divine apparitions of a superior entity, and the text The Four Sacred Logos, where he lists the basic principles of a new online world he describes as The Marketplace. Mirroring Kevin’s practice, 2024 was the year of internet spiritualism and the comeback of medieval iconography: at Sónar, the music and multimedia festival held in Barcelona every year, artistic duo ¥€$Si PERSE and dance company LASADCUM will present CYBERMEDIEVAL, a performance where the terms and conditions of Big Tech companies meet the feudal contracts of medieval times.

Stock Photography Watermarks As the Presence of God (2008), Kevin Bewersdorf

Other artists from the same generation engaged with the “sublime ordinariness” of non-places, the name anthropologist Marc Auge gave to anonymous transitory places, stock imagery and company logos by linking them to a crippling sense of nostalgia where the intimate and the impersonal meet. The artistic practices of DISmag friends Amalia Ulman and Jasper Spicero have been extremely influential for this current second wave of corp-core. Less ironic, their research taps into a specific kind of corporate sincerity. In her 2014 immersive installation The Destruction of Experience, Ulman invited visitors into a space somewhere between a hospital clinic, a church and an office: a maze of white walls, where pharmacy calendars and leftovers from a corporate party stand beside a large company name made of a blue circle and the Nirvana logo. In the background, the humming of Zara Home’s in-store playlist.

The Destruction of Experience (2014), Amalia Ulman

Despite recreating a cold, corporate environment, Ulman’s installation suggests the familiarity of a personal tale. The detachment of the decor blends with the strange feeling of having already visited that space, recalling intimate experiences and the melancholy of a time that will never return: the walls are dull as those of primary school buildings, filled with 70s aseptic decor pieces as a grandparents’ house, and covered in glitter paraphernalia like a preteen secret diary. Jasper Spicero’s films, sculptures and installations work in the same way. His blueish industrial mise-en-scene winks at the intersection of corporate and childhood aesthetics, demonstrating the existence of a visual purity that unites the two. His sculptures of toy birds and mechanical arms merge surgery room furniture and kid’s room decor, evoking family trauma, a hospital visited once, a bleak shopping mall you liked when you were a child. This representation of corporate aesthetics as an aseptic but emotionally charged visual alphabet serves as a bridging experience between the experiences of early internet users and the feelings of the 2020s. Ulman and Spicero were both inspired by the ever-increasing presence of corporations in their intimate worlds, mainly because of platform society’s business model creeping into affective interpersonal relations. Almost 10 years before the first wave of post-internet art, these artists reflected on how interface design was maneuvering the way people related to one another.

Only Starrling Conference Call (2017), Jasper Spicero. Credits: Culture Magazine

Sunset Work Station (2017) Jasper Spicero. Credits: Living Content

The real difference is that Gen Z were already born within a digital landscape ruled by corporations. Placing all the memories of the early years of their life on the internet, they cannot help but feel nostalgic towards a past that was already compromised. For a new generation of digital native artists, Web 2.0 is filled with innocence and nostalgia in a similar way that Web 1.0 was for post-internet artists. Learning by their practice, emerging artists are sympathizing with the feeling of loss towards their past lives online. Dutch artist Melle Nieling represents this feeling by recreating common tropes in old fashioned spam advertising. His works devirtualizes pop-up banners, emphasizing promises of evading taxes, age-reversal serums or making billions by clicking on a link. In works like Soul (2023) and Funeral (2023), some of these statements take a spiritual turn, presenting clickbait stories of people selling their soul in exchange of points on their credit score, or ancient cults paying for funeral bills. Recalling the terrain of online flash games websites and pirate websites that Gen Z spent its pre-adolescent years, Nieling stages a time when scams online looked like annoying spam banners. When the internet was still naive, digital traps to collect and sell your data had the look of stretched images, funky fonts, hot singles to meet in your surroundings and shiny sports cars to win with a single click.

Gwynethat (2024), Mielle Nieling at Loods 6 during Post Fascism, photo by Vex Noir

London-based artist Gordon Hack also investigates the bond he sees between figurative art and corporate imagery, with his paintings recreating the text overload in security signs, real estate advertising and commercial billboards. By asking an industrial sign making company to produce these ads, Hack fuses his practice with that of an industrial manufacturer, inhabiting the role of a corporate worker having to deal with traditional printing processes, materials, typographies, and colour-matching techniques. In a Warholian act of self-automation, Hack’s works look at manual industrial procedures of image-making, opposed to the way AI is used in advertisement today to create a hyperreal world that looks like ours. By choosing industrial processes like silk-screen printing and stenciling, Hack becomes a man-machine, carefully crafting compositions from existing elements: his gestures uncover advertisement processes, opposed to what happens inside the mysterious black box of an AI.

For early post-internet artists, one of the main spaces to experiment the connection between art and  marketplace was the fashion landscape. In 2024, DIS launched the pop-up store DISown in New York, presenting a series of garments that mocked commodity activism – the kind of activism carried out through slogans on mugs, t-shirts, and visor hats – and the meaning of merchandising itself. Still active as an e-commerce platform, DISown produced pieces such as the Coupon Tee: a T-shirt that functions as a real coupon, with a design inspired by the slack aesthetic of promo code  finder websites. The Utility Shirt 2-Pack in collaboration with Lizzie Fitch – part of an artistic duo with Ryan Trecartin –  draws inspiration from vectorized corporate icons to create a pack of tees that “are ideal for team-building sessions, human resources staff, and barefoot CEO’s”. For the perfect stock photoshoot, the Classics Salad Bowl pairs ideally with a fork, a lighthearted woman in her 30s, and an empty kitchen.

Coupon Tee by DISown. Credits: www.disown.dismagazine.com

Utility Shirt 2-Pack by Lizzie Fitch for DISown (credits)

For digital natives, the relationship between fashion and corporate culture is much more linked to a melancholic look at the idealized work spaces they’ve seen on the screen but never experienced, environments that look so unobtainable in these times of precariousness and work/life imbalance. The tendency toward self-branding, skewered in its infancy by early post-internet artists, has resulted in a perpetual state of presenting oneself as an ever-evolving start-up. Never having worked in a corporate environment, Gen Z loves cosplaying formal work wear that winks at adulthood and power. Office Sirens interpret fashion through the lens of movies like Secretary (2003) and American Psycho (2000), with thick black glasses, blazers, knee-length skirts and classy updos. In the first part of 2023, this trend morphed into a new, slightly more status affirming, form: the Boom Boom Aesthetic, or the desire to look like a flashy company CEO. If post-internet artists used fashion as an undisguised critical tool, Gen Z engages with it by applying numerous layers of post-irony and detachment. Inside the entanglements of the algorithm, it’s difficult to discern a critical action from a viral trend.

Singer AMORE in Office Siren. Credits: @tqamore

singer/model Gabbriette in Office Siren. Credits: @gabbriette          

LinkedIn Graphic of “Boom Boom Aesthetic”. Credits: Max Niederhofer

Office nostalgia creeps out, making us longing for a stable income and a cubicle, LinkedIn profiles become the indispensable tool of every artist and theorist to emerge. To find the roots of today’s obsession with corporate aesthetics, there’s a need to look back at the previous generation and the same angst they felt towards losing a space they considered to be salvific. More than being just a visual trend, there’s a precise reason why corporate aesthetics that captivate Gen Z so closely resemble the works of early post-internet art and artists, who keep leading the way over a decade after their emergence. It’s a cross-generational embrace of the feeling that the online world could be eroded, divided up by corporations in order to build sloptimistic, non-human space for bots to profit off themselves. Post-internet art’s observation of how the internet and the marketplace are entangled has shifted from a critique of self-branding practices to nostalgia for a time when online advertising was much less sophisticated. The real question is whether these attempts to critique reality will stand out within the rules of algorithmic culture. Like a creature with sharp teeth, the algorithm devours every cultural symptom by repetition and commodification: a critique becomes a trend, its origins get blurred until they’re harder and harder to catch. The relationship between the internet and corporations will evolve, but will always remain a part of its core structure, and one of the main interests for artists and researchers investigating online ecology. Can we ever go back to a less corporative online life, and will art uncover how?

 

Canada Theory – Geo-Political Debates at INC

This internal INC email exchange from early February began with a posting of Max Haiven on his Substack: Is Canada’s premier Carney a warlord? Three fellow Canadians responded: Henry Warwick, Marc Tuters and David Gauthier.

Canada theory has been high on the INC agenda from day one—and well before. After all, INC stands on the shoulders of both German and Canadian media theory. A record number of Canadians and non-Canadian based there are involved in INC projects, either live and work here in NL and in Europe or work and study there, such as a few of our INC former interns. Canada as angle and method  has multiple personal, cultural and intellectual backgrounds (beyond the infamous Grant-Innes-McLuhan-Kroker-Chun lineage).

Please have a look at the Canadas Semiotexte reader from 1994, if you can find it. Michael Freeman classified the book as such: “This anthology redraws Canada as a complex terraincognita of desire and dismay. “Eco-feminism, censorship, and the ‘queerness’ of the True North. Richly eclectic in tone and material, unrelentingly controversial, and very difficult to ignore. It is likely the most novel take on our state of affairs in quite some time.”

A direct reason for this exchange is Trump’s plan to annex Canada as United States’ 51st state and Carney’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20, 2026. Let’s define Canada Theory. /Geert

INC author Henry Warwick, who became a Canadian citizen himself recently, has been based in Toronto for a long time and is teaching there. His response to Max Haiven:

  1. One year ago, there was an upcoming election. At the end of December 2024, going into January 2025, the Conservatives led by Pierre Poilievre were leading Trudeau and the Liberals 45% to 16%, nearly a 30% deficit. This would have led to a MASSIVE Conservative majority.
  2. Trump took office in February and immediately started with his “Canada is the 51st state” and “Governor Trudeau” bullshit. This made Canadians pretty upset.
    3. while Trump is raging on about the 51st State, Poilievre went gushing over how he looks forward to dealing with Trump, and Trump recommends his election. This was “not a good idea”.
  3. Carney comes into the picture – the Liberals decide they have to ditch Trudeau if they have any hope of winning. So they elect Carney as leader and he becomes PM in March 2025. The election happens about a month later and the Liberals win it, but not with a majority govt – they were 3 seats short.
  4. Carney immediately tells Trump to, basically, shut the fuck up and act like an adult, and begins playing hardball, which he has all the skills and background to do.

Poilievre’s collapse was SPECTACULAR. I was convinced we were going to have our own Trump running the place, instead not only did Carney win the election, Poilievre lost his seat in suburban Ottawa. Poilievre went to Alberta (Canada’s version of Texas) and had a guy who had just won his seat that election to resign so he could have it and stay in government. The guy quit and Poilievre won the by election. Canada dodged a bullet.

Is Carney an optimal PM? Hell no. He’s what we call a “Red Tory” – a fiscal conservative, social liberal. I do not align with his ideas or designs.

HOWEVER: we didn’t have a choice of “optimal” candidates – we had the Red Tory/Liberal Carney, the junior league fascist Poilievre, and Jagmeet Singh, the hapless bland and not very popular leader of the NDP. What Happened? A huge portion of the NDP vote went to Carney. The other Red Tories that were looking to vote against Trudeau suddenly didn’t have Trudeau to hate, and recognised Carney as someone they could deal with. Bang: Carney got elected.

Canada is teetering – the American psyop campaign of Alberta separatism is up to 17% in Alberta. Stellantis, GM, and Ford just removed about 8,000 jobs from Ontario (mostly because of tariffs from the USA). Canada is on its own and is desperately looking for allies, as the USA is no longer trustworthy and in many ways is openly hostile to Canadian sovereignty. So, there’s that pressure to deal with as well. (also, the fucking separatists are even stupider than Poilievre. There are 3 major land treaties with first nations that will still apply whether they are separate or not. Ooops.) It’s a total shitshow.

“Carney presents himself as the liberal alternative to Trump’s fascism, but also as a straight-shooting realist from a “middle power” who can’t afford the illusions of the erstwhile “international rules-based order.”

Carney is in office because it was him or Poilievre, i.e. Canadian Trump, only stupider. THAT is why he is PM. Carney is no prize, but he’s light years better than Poilievre – a fool who won’t even get a security clearance. Seriously. He wants to be PM, but doesn’t want to submit to background checks for a security clearance.

The writer in his ideas about Warlordarchy, should read Chinese history and their theory of The Mandate From Heaven.

The mandate creates a predictable dynastic cycle – first there is chaos, and out of chaos come warlords. The warlords or “regional leaders” fight for control, effectively competing to see who would receive the new Mandate of Heaven. Someone does and establishes a new Dynasty. The Dynasty flourishes and then becomes decadent, falling back into chaos, creating new warlords – rinse repeat.

I learned about this in the early 2000s. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104682/2000-01_China_Debates_Future.pdf

China has been anticipating a multipolar geopolitics since the mid 1980s. None of them anticipated Xi consolidating power and walling himself off from criticism. Also, at the time, the demographic bomb had yet to go off, so that didn’t play into their war gaming theory, either. In anycase, Haiven’s crude theory of “Warlordarchy” is simply a weak recapitulation of the Mandate of Heaven.

This doesn’t mean he’s wrong.

Carney is not the problem right now. Yes, Carney is suboptimal. But we’re dealing with actual fascism, and for all his faults he is antifascist, so when it came to choosing a PM in April 2025, Carney was the obvious choice. Right now he’s at 60% approval, and he won with 40%. So, he’s fairly popular with the average Canadian. Stopping Carney from being a neoliberal curse will be the product of the next election, on the one hand, and consistent opposition to his bad policies for the duration.

A number of people are discussing the new economic order as a kind of neofeudalism. I discussed that in my Dissertation esp. with my references to Drahos’s book Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? from 2003. Also, his book A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, which was really important to my Diss. Lately a number of people seem to be thinking “Oh, this internet bullshit is all driving to feudalism!” Duh. Drahos was on it over 20 years ago.

Doctorow and Scott and others singing that tune are, with Drahos, more accurate than Haiven – the feudalism we’re skipping into is not land based – it’s information based. The Enclosures ended centuries ago. Deleuze talked about Endocolonialism – that’s much more on point.

At the same time, I am very much in agreement with Haiven’s critical points – they are correct.  The Neoliberal order set us up for the fascism that is following on. I just think he misses important context about Carney. Carney’s not my preferred choice, but given what was happening, he’ll do for now.

Also: Churchill was out of office months after VE day.

best, Henry

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https://kether-music.bandcamp.com
http://www.kether.com

MoneyLab participant Max Haiven responded:

I don’t disagree about the immediate reason why Carney was elected, but I think there’s much more to say here about longer term trends and Canadian political economy and politics. Carney is Bay Street’s man through and through. I don’t think my argument suggests that he is the worst thing in the world. It was intended as a somewhat provocative antidote too the strange and very Canadian euphoria about him.

When faced with the lesser of two evils I refuse to choose, and at risk of being unpopular I’m always going to try and recall that we can and should have leaders and systems that serve the commons and the common good, rather than the rich and powerful. I think when faced with the kind of murderous “realism” that all politicians today cite (both Trump and Carney), it’s more important than ever to show them contempt and insist that we have the capacity to produce a world that meets everyone’s needs and allows us to live in peace and abundance. I refuse the blackmail of realism or pragmatism. Let us build grassroots power to refuse and rebel, and then negotiate, not capitulate to their false spectrum of options in advance! Regrettably the state of movements in Canada and many other places is very weak at the present moment but I don’t think that capacity will improve if we accept their terms.

Canada is indeed in a moment of profound and very dangerous crisis. But I think a crisis is the most important time to fundamentally rethink the purpose of society the economy and the state. The opportunity will not come again for a generation at least. I’m not optimistic that such a rethinking will happen but I feel if I have any responsibility in this mess, it is to try and help provoke it!

This is an interesting point on warlords although I don’t think my admittedly hastily sketched theory is only a warmed over rehashing of the Mandate from Heaven, other way I’m very interested in that. I actually think that the CPC right now looks at the world as precisely the Warlordarchy I am proposing, and in continuity with these older Chinese imperial philosophies. I’m working on something that tries to move us beyond both this Chinese framework and the typical liberal framework that would insist on an antinomy between the warlord and the emperor or  the warlord and the modern state. That theory isn’t exactly ready yet as it still baking in the oven!

All the best, MH

Henry’s response:

I don’t think Trump will invade Taiwan, Greenland, or Canada. I think his next target is Cuba. Many Cubans in the USA are rather right wing (in a kind of knee jerk antipathy to the Cuban govt seen as communist/left wing).  So, a defeat of the Cuban regime would (in Trump et al’s blinkered reality) shore up support in Florida. So, there are possible benefits for the Regime to invading Cuba. Also, Cuba already has an American base on it (Guantanamo Bay) and the east end of Cuba is only 145km from Florida. So, an invasion of Cuba would be comparatively easy. My guess is that Trump is holding back on this, as it is a tall order of military effort, and he uses these adventures to distract / dilute news of the Epstein files.

This particular brand of fascism from the Trump Regime is as embedded in media theory of the attention economy as political economy and psychology, making belligerence a tool of message control and attentional focus.

Taiwan is, from what I’ve been able to gather, not under direct threat, however, it is under more threat in the short term than the long term. This is due to China’s demographic collapse. China is WAY below replacement (IIRC something like 0.9, replacement is 2.1) and its aging population is starting to strain healthcare, pensions, and social safety nets. It’s economic growth plans are kind of cooked by a shrinking workforce. Xi’s govt has made efforts to encourage higher birth rates through two- and three-child policies, but these have largely failed, and China is very much in a population death spiral, like Korea, Japan, Italy, and Germany. I attribute this to shortsighted urbanisation policies combined with an export centred economy. They have to keep wages low to be competitive, so the people of China aren’t as wealthy or well paid as say Norway or USA. The space in urban high rise buildings is limited and expensive, so children became an economic burden. So, if China was to take Taiwan, they would have to do it soon while they still have a surplus of young men.

However, I don’t see an invasion anytime soon for a variety of reasons.

  1. It would take time and it’s too easy to see troop build ups.
  2. Taiwan is 180km from China mainland. China has built some large landing craft/barges, but they are very slow. Let’s say 30kmph. Which is 6 hours from mainland to Taiwan. the moment said barges got half way, Taiwan would send fleets of drones and missiles after them. They would never arrive. And if they did, you’re going to have to deal with #3
  3. China hasn’t been in a proper full scale war in DECADES (vs Vietnam, which ended in 1991). Their leadership has little more battle experience than the kids they’re going to have to draft into dying in this mess.
  4. The core value of Taiwan is chip manufacture. Otherwise, it’s just a largish island full of people. The moment the invasion seems to be succeeding, they will simply evacuate the factories and blow them to smithereens (and probably fly the expensive core components out of the country.)
  5. The moment the Chinese set off to invade Taiwan, ASEAN and similar orgs would get involved. The lifeline of China, oil from the middle east, would be cut off and blockaded. Their economy would collapse, and without the energy they need their war machine would fail, and the country would collapse.

So, I’m not really worried about Taiwan.

 Trump is not going to invade Greenland. He doesn’t have to. The present arrangements are that the USA can put as many bases there as it wants anyway, so security isn’t the issue. The minerals underground are also not an issue. Sure, they are undoubtedly there, but they are also under a couple km of ice. It’s going to take a few centuries for that to melt out. So, no. Trump will declare “a new page in the history of USA/Greenland/Denmark” and say that the USA will multiply the number of bases in a “New accord” with Denmark. Of course there’s no new accord – the USA can already do that under present treaties with Denmark. He comes off looking strong and gets to dodge the bullet of having NATO declare war on the USA.

Same with Canada. If he invades Canada, that will bring NATO against him, and the economy would completely collapse. Sure – M1 tanks would cover Toronto – he would easily win the battle – but he would lose the war.

Frankly, I think the Republicans will have Trump removed from office. Hopefully next month (ides of March) but certainly by Solstice – otherwise it will be an absolute bloodbath at the election in November.

If the Dems sweep House and Senate in November, which is entirely possible, Vance will get impeached and convicted, and then whoever is his VP will become president, and will be on a very short neoliberal leash from the worthless Dem Leadership (Schumer et al – useless bunch of dopes).

more later!

H

Marc Tuters, a Canadian media theorist based in Amsterdam, writes:

Hi Geert,

what I find interesting is less a question of whether Carney is right or wrong, and more how global politics is now being articulated, and where. As an IR diagnosis, Carney’s Davos speech strikes me as quite compelling: weaponized interdependence, the end of comfortable assumptions about a US-led order, and the strategic predicament of middle powers. This was the speech that Europe needed to make and Canada made it.

From what I could see in the thread I don’t really read Max as disputing that analysis so much as reacting to what he fears follows from it — a narrowing of political imagination under the banner of realism.

Where my own ambivalence comes in is precisely Davos as a venue. It’s a space of elite coordination that is structurally anti-democratic, where business and politics collude under the language of “stakeholder capitalism,” a concept that remains dubious even when dressed up in green garments. That makes Carney’s speech important, but also symptomatic: global governance increasingly articulated outside democratic institutions.

I was also struck by Carney’s use of Havel. The point about hollow ideals functioning as rituals of compliance is sharp, but there’s a slippage worth noting. The slogan being mocked (“Workers of the world, unite”) names worker solidarity, not just elite hypocrisy — and Trumpism, in any case, doesn’t really operate through high ideals at all, but through coercion, resentment, and transactional loyalty. That makes the analogy illuminating, but also incomplete.

I’m less interested in judging the characters than in watching the stage shift. Politics is moving out of parliaments and into places like Davos, where it seems like ideas of solidarity and democratic agency are the first things left outside the door.

Best, Marc

David Gauthier, also based in The Netherlands, teaches at the Media & Culture department of Utrecht University:

One small thing that is missing from Henry’s analysis of how Carney got elected is: Québec. The vote in la belle province is what got the guy elected and there are a bunch of people that usually vote Bloc Québécois that voted Liberal, which is really weird. The Parti Québécois (sovereignty  party) is on the rise now (also weird, because they were technically dead) and I wonder what kind of reaction the Québec electorate will have if a new election comes around.

Henry Warwick adds:

Oh, my, for certain – the Bloc voting Liberal was instrumental, for sure – every vote mattered! However, from my research, while the shift in the Bloc toward Carney was crucial, it doesn’t compare with the nearly complete self-immolation of the NDP.

In 2021, the previous election, saw Trudeau’s re-election and the following results in seats:

2021
Liberal 160
Conservative 119
Bloc Québécois 32
New Democratic 25
Green 2

These are the results of the 2025 election that saw Carney win:

2025
Liberal 169
Conservative 144
Bloc Québécois 22
New Democratic 7
Green 1

Clearly, the Bloc lost 10 seats that went to the Liberals – about a 32% shrinkage, which was harsh. The Greens lost 50% (1 seat). The NDP? They lost 18 seats – 72%! Their leader, Jagmeet Singh, lost his seat. They even lost official party status! Yikes! Talk abou taking one for the team. The NDP is in a serious pickle right now. Singh resigned, obviously, and the party is rudderless. However – I think that might all change very soon. Avi Lewis (husband of Naomi Klein) tossed his hat into the ring, and the possibility of his winning NDP leadership has a number of people pretty jazzed – having Naomi Klein in orbit of the PM is a serious asset. That would make things… Very Interesting. We will know in 29 MAR 2026 after the NDP Convention in Winnepeg.

Re: Taiwan, the Dutch INC affiliated researcher  (born in Taiwan), Conny Tzu Lin writes:

China’s best strategy atm is to sabotage within the island. Namely disinformation war, cyber attacks and the manipulation of politicians. The best way is to make a 50+ % of Taiwanese population come to the term that it’s better to ‘keep peace’ and not resist an invasion. The whole effort of the civil movement is not to make this happen.

Marc Tuters responds:

What interests me in this exchange is less a moral sorting of figures (Carney vs. Poilievre, realism vs. resistance) than a shift in where politics is being articulated and legitimized. Read as an IR diagnosis, Carney’s Davos speech is persuasive: weaponized interdependence, the erosion of trust in a US-led order, and the predicament of middle powers. In that sense, it felt like the speech Europe could not quite make for itself — and Canada did.

At the same time, Davos matters here not just as a backdrop but as a symptom. It is a space of elite coordination that is structurally anti-democratic, where politics is reframed as necessity, risk management, and “realism,” often under the language of stakeholder capitalism — a concept that remains dubious even when dressed up in green terms. This raises a different question than whether Carney is right or wrong: what happens to democratic contestation when global governance is increasingly articulated outside democratic institutions?

Carney’s invocation of Václav Havel is telling in this regard. The critique of hollow ideals functioning as rituals of compliance is sharp, but there is a slippage worth noting. The slogan being mocked — “Workers of the world, unite” — names worker solidarity, not merely elite hypocrisy. Moreover, Trumpism does not operate through high ideals at all, but through coercion, resentment, and transactional loyalty. The analogy is illuminating, but incomplete.

David Gauthier responds:

I don’t see Havel’s problematising the shop owner’s putting the slogan “Workers of the world, unite” in front of his window dissing/mocking workers solidarity, but showing that it became an empty / automatic slogan that lost its meaning and that merely functions as a signal of compliance with the regime (which in a sense is exactly not what the slogan means). My reading of Carney’s reference to Havel’s shop owner is that liberal democracies running on financial infrastructures have their empty / automatic slogans (“liberal democracy” perhaps being one? — “we’re open for business” maybe? — how about “we love freetrade” ?!)] that are loosing their meaning and merely function as a (empty) signal of compliance with the USA regime and, perhaps more importantly, its historical ideology (the “beacon of light” of “liberal democracy”, the “we’re open for BIG business,” the “come spend you pension money: we are the number one financial and bond market”, etc.), not just Trump’s non-sense (he is only a small blimp in the USA’s historical ideology).

Easy to see that even here in Europe, people are still going through those rituals reciting these empty slogans, hoping it has the desired effects. Perhaps in Canada, the reaction to the tariffs was so strong that people are at least aware of the sign / slogan and how it became an empty signifier very fast? I can ask my mom, lol. For me, Carney is saying there is no way back when you take the sign off your window. Trump in power or not.]

 

Abolishing Capitalist Totality

Abolishing Capitalist Totality: What Is to Be Done under Real Subsumption? Edited by Anthony Iles & Mattin When capitalism feels inescapable, theory becomes a weapon to challenge fatalistic totalities. This book explores the limits of the colonization of everyday life by economic logic gone mad.  Wherever we are we find ourselves choking, trapped in a […]

Identity, Mimesis, and the Escape from the Self: An Interview with Alexander Douglas

On 10 February 2026, I participated in an event at Spui25 where Alexander Douglas gave a talk about the digital self in relation to his latest book, Against Identity: The Wisdom of Escaping the Self. In the book, Douglas draws on three distinct sources—the Zhuangzi, the philosophy of Spinoza, and the theory of René Girard—to argue that the human quest for a fixed and definitive identity can be seen as the fall of humanity. Driven by the ‘romantic lie’ that there is a stable self to be found, we are drawn into rivalry, anxiety, and various pathologies. The path away from this identity regime, Douglas suggests, lies in embracing indeterminacy, ambiguity, uncertainty, and difference.

Thinking through processes of becoming is necessary in our current culture of stasis. On the one hand, we are constantly fed identities, commodities, trends, and viral moments; on the other hand, it is increasingly difficult to attain any of them. There is more choice but less room for human agency. Desires are reproduced at an ever-accelerating pace, yet they are never allowed to run their course, keeping us hooked to their constant flow. Mechanisms that spark transformation—processes of breakdowns and build-ups that chart paths toward unknown horizons—are necessary to explore. This environment underscores the urgency of Douglas’ research into escaping the self.

Intrigued by the book and its quest against identity, I invited Douglas for a written interview. In our exchange, we discuss identity, language, mimesis, affect, and transformation.

Mela Miekus: I would first like to ask you where and how this research began for you. Why did you choose to work with (and against) identity? What is your identity?

Alexander Douglas: My identity, like everyone’s, is a cacophony of echoes of all the figures around me, whom I’ve taken as models to imitate, often unconsciously. The three figures I try to think with in Against Identity—Zhuangzi, Spinoza, and Girard—could be seen as models for various features of myself, although I wasn’t thinking about this while writing. These features are all quite incompatible with each other. Girard exemplifies the sort of dignified scholar I aspired to become when I went into academia. Spinoza echoes a certain intemperate rebellious streak, which I usually regret recognising in myself but sometimes invite. Zhuangzi expresses a bit of gentle chaos and a carefreeness that I occasionally manage successfully to summon. Beyond this, the figures are perhaps screens upon which I project my ancestry. Zhuangzi and Spinoza reflect the Luso-Asian heritage I inherited from my mother, while Girard, although I have no French ancestry, cuts the same sort of suave and erudite figure that my father embodied. Of course, it seems silly to suggest that I was engaged in self-discovery in writing a book called Against Identity: The Wisdom of Escaping the Self, but that isn’t quite what I mean. In the conclusion I propose that we might benefit from converting our search for ourselves into a discovery of the other. I think I went through a bit of that conversion, although there is still a long way to go, and that’s what I was trying to report on in the book. But there is also a story of facing a peculiar kind of loss and grief, which drove much of the thought in this book. I think that through grief I discovered a deeper joy, and I used this book to share some of it.

Mela Miekus: In the first section of the book, you discuss Zhuangzi, the ancient Chinese philosopher to whom we ascribe a compilation of canonical texts within the philosophical tradition of Daoism. Within this section, you pay a lot of attention to language in developing your arguments. I enjoyed how you conceptualise wo versus wu and guide the reader through additional terms such as sang, which beautifully illustrate the different modes of selfing and unselfing. Can you talk me through your process here and the role of language in theorising this section of the book?

Alexander Douglas: The Zhuangzi uses language in a very rich way, and not just to convey what my analytic philosopher colleagues would call “propositional content”. This is made quite explicit, for example in the second chapter where a series of deep questions about language and meaning are asked but not answered:

“But human speech is not just a blowing of air. Speech has something of which it speaks, something it refers to”. Yes, but what it refers to is peculiarly unfixed. So is there really anything it refers to? Or has nothing ever been referred to? You take it to be different from the chirping of baby birds. But is there really any difference between them? Or is there no difference? Is there any dispute, or is there no dispute? Anything demonstrated, or nothing demonstrated? (Brook Ziporyn’s translation)

Clearly it cannot be as simple as looking past the symbols themselves to the meaning—the Zhuangzi leaves it quite mysterious what precisely there is behind the symbols and whether it can really be captured by us. This means that if we want to enter into the spirit of Zhuangzi we have to look carefully at the way it plays with the surface features of language—the part of language that resembles the “chirping of baby birds”—that is, the sounds and the shapes of the symbols. This is extremely difficult with such an ancient text, since we have only partial knowledge of how the original authors would have used the symbols in question and what sounds they might have been associated with. The Pinyin romanisations I use (following convention) spell out the sounds of modern Mandarin, not the language that would have been spoken by the authors of Zhuangzi. I depend entirely on the work of scholars to try to grasp this dimension of Zhuangzi. One thing that can’t be ignored is the number of ways there are to refer to “I” or the self—ji 己, wo 我, wu 吾, zi 自, etc. Meanwhile the characters sometimes placed with these, to indicate an absence or a losing of self—wu 無, sang 喪—have rich philosophical meanings of their own, which mere one-to-one translation can’t convey. It’s not only the words that are different but the way that language is used—for example how one and the same character can be noun, verb, or adjective, or somewhere in between. The whole text appears to be a sort of dance of words. I’m far from understanding this dance, but I wanted to try to get across a little of its sense, even though this meant challenging the reader a bit (and setting myself an extreme challenge when it came to recording the audio version!).

Mela Miekus: Throughout the book, you explore the concept of ‘identitylessness’ through the perspectives of three different philosophers: Zhuangzi, Spinoza, and Girard. While we learn much about how they view identitylessness, I would be curious to hear your own understanding of what our ‘communion in a shared identitylessness’ could look like.

Alexander Douglas: It’s hard to imagine what it would really look like, but we can put away one fear that holds us back. People are often afraid that if we relax our constant activity of self-definition and categorisation then things will melt into a kind of undifferentiated sludge—that we’ll “make a sop of all this solid globe”, as Ulysses warns in Troilus and Cressida. In fact, the purity that people worry about protecting is a myth to begin with. When people become more integrated and open to each other’s influence—more willing to be transformed through their encounters with each other—they don’t lose their unique characteristics at all. The less we all strive to develop our own distinct character and protect it from dilution by foreign influences, the more individually characterful and idiosyncratic we become. We can see this in common experience. The people I’ve found to be most charmingly and recognisably themselves are not those who curate, protect, and insulate their personality. Rather, it’s the people who are most open to changing and learning from others. This is for the same reason that the most cosmopolitan and multicultural places are often the most unmistakably distinctive. So, when trying to visualise what I called “communion in a shared identitylessness”, I think we should expect the unexpected: such a communion might bring out our individuality and all the differences that make us interesting, in a way that individualism could never have done. Uniqueness might be one of those things that vanish when you pursue them directly but emerge in full splendour when you allow yourself to be distracted by something else. So while I can’t say what communion in shared identitylessness would be like, I’d like to suggest that it won’t be homogenous or uniform or bland, which seems to be what those who don’t like this idea fear in it. I would also add that if, as the thinkers I examined suggest, identity gets in the way of love—erecting distinctions as barriers among us and obscuring us behind definite concepts that leave out a great deal—then a condition of shared identitylessness could also be one of pure love.

Mela Miekus: Throughout the book, you show that identity is never born of a true self but of an unconscious mimesis of the models around us. You note that imitation itself is not necessarily the problem, but rather the fact that it happens unconsciously. What about a conscious mimesis? Do you think we are capable of creating space (or a shield) between the identity we imitate in public and the personal “self” that does not have to be led by it?

Alexander Douglas: Yes, I think that it’s better to imitate consciously than unconsciously. One important theme in the book, which I find in all three central figures, is that there is no option of simply withdrawing from mimesis. Imitation—mimesis—is just how our identity forms. Heroic ideas of authenticity and self-determination are just dust we throw up to hide from our fundamentally mimetic, unoriginal nature. Mimesis naturally leads us towards self-deception: the figure we imitate appears to us as a model, not an imitator. Wanting to be like that figure, we are tempted to tell ourselves a story in which we are the original: the genuine article whom others wish to imitate. Realising that everyone is thoroughly mimetic, even our models, can help us to overcome the impulse to tell ourselves these wishful stories. Nevertheless, even if we imitate consciously, fixed models trap us into fixed ways of being and seeing the world. What the book suggests is that we should escape, not from imitation as such, but from the imitation of fixed models—that we should learn to imitate and be influenced in a more fluid, flexible, even fickle way. We should be open to as many mimetic models as possible and always ready to discover new ones—to listen to voices we never thought to listen to before. Nor, as I said, do we need to worry that we’ll lose our unique and distinctive character in doing so. Again, being unique and distinctive is somehow much deeper and richer than being definite or definable by some fixed concept. This is something I learned from watching my father going through the stages of Alzheimer’s disease, learning at every stage that none of the things I took to define him actually defined him and accepting in the end that love reaches deeper than identity. We remain ourselves by transforming; our essence is wandering. This is a truth revealed not by thought but by love, and philosophy, as Raimon Panikkar said, is much more the wisdom of love than the love of wisdom.

Mela Miekus: The third section of the book is committed to the philosophies of twentieth-century French theorist René Girard. Within it, there is a subsection on “Limits of Political Liberation”, and I’m curious about how you navigate Girard’s opinions here. What about the need for political liberation stemming from a direct threat to one’s life or one’s community’s life? Is this a point that surpasses identity?

Alexander Douglas: Yes, definitely. Girard is responding to a particular species of fantasy to which intellectuals are particularly susceptible: the fantasy that liberating us from certain structures, institutions, and prohibitions will remove our deepest sources of frustration and anxiety. Girard warns us that there is no such saving utopia—that the problem lies in what we are, not what we have built. None of that is to say that there is no point in trying to escape from directly harmful oppression. For example, when I discussed Girard’s observation that abolishing private property would not bring about an end to human competitiveness and envy, I noted that it might nevertheless (for all I know) rescue a great many people from material deprivation, and that would be reason enough to pursue it. I wasn’t trying to make a point about private property as such but rather to note that even if liberation from our deepest troubles is impossible, liberation from certain oppressions certainly is possible. We might not be able to escape the frustrations of mimesis, but many people could escape being brutalised, controlled, and exploited to the extent that they currently are. That is very much, as you put it, a point that surpasses identity, except that I think identity-thinking can often get in the way of liberation. For one thing, of course, certain notions of identity are often part of the motivation or at least the justification for brutalisation, control, and exploitation. Moreover, once people define themselves in terms of these notions, moving to a situation in which they make less sense becomes unthinkable: people feel that allowing this would mean ceasing to be what they are. So things don’t change, even when they are horrible. And finally, it is surprisingly easy for a well-meaning project like overthrowing a system of oppression to become a new way for people to identify themselves, and for preserving this identity to become their priority rather than the original motivation. People can even get into the position of avoiding any actual solution to a problem because they have defined themselves in terms of a struggle against that problem. So the situation is difficult but not hopeless: our commitment to our identities makes it hard for us to really help each other, but if we weaken that commitment then many possibilities for social reform open up, even if Girard is right that the image of total liberation is a mirage.

Mela Miekus: Let’s talk about affect as a driver of the self. Your work emphasises the problem with imitation, external models, and the idea of an empty self; empty in the sense that it lacks a stable, inherent core. But for the self to appear “empty”, we would first have to imagine it as autonomous and sovereign; as something with borders that needs to be filled.

Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, argues that the self is always relational and fundamentally precarious, constituted through ties to others that can be undone. An “I” cannot lose a “you” and return unchanged, because that “you” was part of the “I”, Butler explains. Have you considered this precarious, affective dimension of the self, particularly the body, its boundaries, and experiences (like mourning) that disrupt the myth of sovereignty? How does this relational and affective vulnerability fit into the model of the self from Against Identity?

Alexander Douglas: You’re right that the standard Western notion of emptiness requires fixed boundaries, but this is not true of the notion of emptiness or wu 無 in Zhuangzi. Wu 無 seems instead to be a kind of teeming chaos of partial beings—Ellen Marie Chen refers to a “fertile nothingness”. I’m told that there is a similar way of thinking about the “quantum vacuum” in physics, and in some Indian thought (e.g. the “net of Indra”) you have the idea that things are empty precisely because they are so interdependent and interdefined. That is the sense of emptiness I meant in discussing the idea that we are essentially empty: what mimetic models allow us to do is select from the chaos of overlapping and contradictory possible selves that constitutes our essential “fertile” emptiness. Indeed, as I mentioned, my own experience of mourning was part of the thinking that went into Against Identity. What I learned about grief was that it is mixed up with terror: when you lose somebody you’ve always known, you are struck by the terror of also losing yourself, because you can form no notion of yourself independent of that fixed point of reference. I think Butler’s point is absolutely fundamental. It is the other who makes me myself, but not in the trivial sense that I need a contrast to bring out my character, nor in the philosophical sense that what I am doesn’t truly exist until it is recognised by somebody else. It is much deeper than that: the part of the other that I don’t know and don’t control—the part that is entirely beyond me is somehow also part of me. Everything that I am and do is a partial function of something entirely hidden from me and alien to me. Indefiniteness, embodied in the wild crowd of selves beyond my comprehension, is an ingredient in my definiteness. When I fully embrace this, I become open to the other, and a harmony between indefiniteness and definiteness is achieved. If, on the other hand, I try in my pursuit of definiteness to escape from indefiniteness then I will experience disharmony, and I will have to hide the other away behind an idea I form of the other—an idea that is controlled by me and designed for maximum consistency with my self-definition. I will never really see the other. I will not, in fact, really see anyone or anything; all things will become sets and props in the autobiographical play I perform to myself. This is what I meant when I wrote in my conclusion: “I believe that we have barely begun to live in the world together”. I hope to write another book elaborating on this rather cryptic statement.

 

Alexander Douglas was born in Canberra, Australia where he studied music and philosophy. He now teaches the history of philosophy and the philosophy of economics at the University of St Andrews. In addition to Against Identity: The Wisdom of Escaping the Self (Penguin, 2025), he is the author of The Philosophy of Hope: Beatitude in Spinoza (Routledge, 2023) and The Philosophy of Debt (Routledge, 2016). He has grown increasingly interested in combining ideas from Western and East Asian philosophy. He loves music, literature, history, and engineering. He lives with his wife in Edinburgh.

Mela Miekus is an Amsterdam-based writer and researcher with a background in art theory and curating. Her research practice centers around contemporary art and internet cultures with a focus on mediated figure design, the politics of aesthetics, and online girlhood. She is currently a researcher at the Institute of Network Cultures.

Jazz is My Religion, Ted Joans is My Perspective

Minor Compositions Podcast Season 2 Episode 2 Jazz is My Religion, Ted Joans is My Perspective  In this episode of the Minor Compositions, we are joined by Steven Belletto and Grégory Pierrot, in order to discuss Steven’s book Black Surrealist. The Legend of Ted Joans. Together we explore Joans as Beat Generation insider, jazz trumpeter, […]

The EU Energy Transition: Doing More with More

The EU Energy Transition: Doing More with More

By Floriana Cerniglia and Francesco Saraceno

In a context marked by economic and geopolitical tensions, the European Union is called upon to make energy a pillar of its strategic autonomy. Accelerating on the adoption of renewables is essential not only to meet environmental commitments, but also to address the productivity gap with the United States and reduce dependence on fossil fuels, which exposes the EU to supply shocks and geopolitical blackmailing. Lower reliance on fossil fuel means lower energy costs and less import dependency, with positive effects not only on the environment but also on productivity and economic security: the transition is not just an environmental choice, but a lever for economic sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

According to this perspective, energy policy cannot be separated from the new industrial policy invoked by the Draghi Report. Leaving the structural transformation of the EU economy to markets alone is not enough: it is necessary to facilitate it by reshaping and shortening supply chains, eliminating bottlenecks in strategic sectors, shifting resources toward high-value-added activities, and developing active labor market policies.

These themes are the focus of the sixth Outlook on Public Investment in Europe (More with More: Investing in the Energy Transition. 2025 European Public Investment Outlook). The Outlook highlights, on the one hand, how the EU continues to move in a scattered way; on the other hand, more fundamentally, both public and private investment is insufficient. EU Member states have different sources of energy and often have divergent interests, stemming from specific industrial histories and unequal resource endowments. Consequently – as noted in the first part of the Outlook – the decarbonization is certainly progressing in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, but with strong differences in industrial policies, regulatory frameworks, and incentives. The difficulty of building a truly common and adequately financed energy policy emerges, for example, in the chapter written by our colleagues from the EIB.

In the few years since the introduction of the Green Deal in 2019, the context has become significantly more complicated. The Green Deal's main objective was reducing emissions, with an eye on the consequences for distribution and welfare. Today, the EU must juggle several, at times competing, objectives: decarbonizing; reviving an industry that has moved late and is now under pressure from the green transition and from competition from the United States and China; ensuring supply- and value-chain security in an unstable geopolitical environment; and mitigating the distributional impact of industrial restructuring. The second part of the Outlook links the energy transition to horizontal themes such as mission-orientedpolicies for industrial competitiveness, research and innovation, and vertical policies on green hydrogen, grid infrastructure, and access to critical raw materials. In a situation of tighter budget constraints and new spending priorities (particularly defence), and without proactive policies for fair distribution of costs and benefits, public consensus for the transition risks weakening; to avoid this, focus on local energy communities and equitable use of carbon resources are of paramount importance.

The Outlook's chapters are written by authors from different backgrounds and institutions, but the thread that links them is clear: without strong European coordination and stable public investment, the energy transition risks slowing down and weighing on the economy precisely when it should instead accelerate and act as a driver for sustained and sustainable growth.

European institutions do not seem equipped to support a genuine common energy and industrial policy. Following the short COVID-19-related parenthesis of Next Generation EU, the return to "frugal" positions by several EU actors and the limited ambition of the new Multiannual Financial Framework make an EU-wide push for industrial and energy policy unlikely. The necessary investments will therefore have to be carried out by Member States, which, however, are constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact.

For this reason, in our introduction, we propose an Augmented Golden Rule that would exclude investment, both tangible and intangible, from the 3% deficit limit of the Stability Pact. The logic would not be very different from the recent decision to exempt defence spending from the Pact's limits, in the framework of the SAFE initiative. However, unlike that measure, it would be institutionalized, to become the outcome of a democratic process regarding the EU’s investment priorities: the Council and Parliament would periodically (for example when approving the EU budget) reach an agreement on priority sectors in which there is the need to increase the stock of (tangible and/or intangible) capital; national governments could then finance these priorities through debt, in exemption from the Pact.

To prevent market pressure on individual countries, the Augmented Golden Rule should be accompanied by a European Debt Agency that would issue Eurobonds and lend to national countries to finance the commonly agreed investment priorities. The modulation of interest rates on these loans would ensure fiscal discipline, while protecting governments from undue market pressure.

Without a rethinking of the EU economic governance, a strategy that integrates the energy transition, competitiveness, and security will inevitably remain incomplete.

Access this book and others in the series.

Bodies in the Shape of Time – Natalie Mariko in conversation with MIRA新伝統 (Raphael Leray and Honami Leray)

Introduction to the Interview by Natalie Mariko

Like many, I spend a lot of time lost in rot. I wonder how many days I have stared, almost numb, into the endless stream of other people’s memories, while scenes of train cars, café chairs, and beds blur together. It’s been at least a few weeks.

Mind control is real, and we’re more disconnected than ever. Lost in a digital world, we feel pressure to join in on social media. In this space, time has no clear shape.

Simone Weil saw attention and presence as a form of prayer. In the ‘attention economy,’ focus splits into isolated pockets, and presence suffers, interrupted by constant notifications and the noise of daily life. Every place has its own soundtrack: trap music blasts at the corner shop, thunder cracks, and vehicles fill the streets. Athens moves with sound. Cities can be seen as fields of interpretation, mapped by inattention and layered with loss. Moments lost to digital distraction reflect, in religious terms, the turning inward that limits outward possibility.

Copies of ‘realities’ give the illusion of presence and progress, forming chaotic mixes of personal moments. When art maintains a chaotic presence instead of dissolving into bland or moralising forms, it keeps traces of earlier times alive. This is most clear in performance. Performance strips away screen voyeurism, revealing its lack of real experience.

Simply put, you can’t experience a performance without attention, and random online content lacks emotional connection. Political content uses exaggerated emotions to drive repetition and turns suffering into products. In contrast, performance requires presence. If performance becomes only a screen spectacle, it loses emotional impact, and presence becomes meaningless.

Rosanna McLaughlin’s essay Against Morality describes the trend in the 2010s of replacing lack of artistic emotion with moral purity, which she calls ‘liberal realism.’ When art plays the moral judge in a closed world and forgets its power to affect reality, its transformative impact is reduced to slogans. Ironically, this makes such art easy to dismiss or even a tool for fascist ideas. To achieve meaningful change, alternative mythologies that are not easily consumed are needed. Even imperfect performance that resists moral rules reopens the possibility more than rigid commentary.

The title of MIRA新伝統’s new work, Mythoplaxy, combines mythology and praxis. It questions illusions and embraces performing mythology as a revolutionary act. The effectiveness of this gesture and the music is subjective. Still, it points in a direction I support. Political and technological changes separate individuals from the universal context. Federico Campagna explains that this creates ‘dividuals,’ categorized and separated from possibility. The body, when freed from strict definition and given to a living audience, takes on a collective shape of time.

Natalie Mariko: Laura Tripaldi’s book, Parallel Minds, engages with Karen Barad’s notion of intra-action. Tripaldi writes that subjectivities exist in objects in the world, and consciousness is not a precondition for the existence of thought.

Rafael Leray: It deals with the idea of an object having a cognition or material memory.

NM: These objects are shaped by my objectivity toward them. It’s more than colliding in space; we and the objects co-define each other through our relationship. Your work as MIRA新伝統 seems similarly rooted in intra-active relationships with one another and with your chosen spaces. What are you both reading now?

RL: I hoard books. I’m finishing Federico Campagna’s Prophetic Culture and bought a book on cyberpunk for its cover. I recently read Philip K. Dick’s VALIS Trilogy, which was challenging for its lack of narrative shape. Reading’s been hard since moving to Athens. In Tokyo, I’d take a book to the sento for one or two hours, three or four times a week.

Honami Leray: Lately, before bed, I’ve been reading Ancient Magic in Greece and Rome, which I found at my favorite Athens bookstore. It also helps me study English, so I read it slowly, one chapter at a time. Here, magic isn’t supernatural but part of the everyday—a way to reconnect with the world. The book describes actual ritual sites, which feel like lingering residues.

The second book I’m into is Vermis I by Plastiboo. I found it by chance at a Paris indie bookstore and was genuinely happy to discover such a striking book. Presenting it as an official guide for a non-existent game stirs the imagination.

NM: Tripaldi explains that some technologies’ intelligence comes from rigidity. The ideal physical building material, symbolizing progress, becomes incrementally harder—from adobe to graphene. But she notes that weaving fabric is technologically more complex than making ultra-durable metal. Soft technologies, such as fabrics, are more adaptable to change.

Tech oligarchs equate optimization with technological perfection, valuing obedient machines, aligning with emerging fascism. The environment must adapt to the structure of technology. Campagna calls this Technic’s absolute language.

Your work mixes technology and ritual performance. When you relate to technology, how does ritual either oppose or reinforce the violent elements within the technological? Cyberpunk is a good example, as much of modern tech seems to be influenced by precisely this.

RL: Cyberpunk is extremely violent. It’s also dystopian. Almost all of these stories feature a totalitarian government that people are fighting against. But the precondition of that totalitarianism is technology itself.

I have a love-hate relationship with cyberpunk. I think it’s wonderful. It’s, in some ways, my childhood. But what I’ve been looking for recently are adaptable fictions. Octavia E. Butler, for instance. Bloodchild was something we both read when we arrived in Athens. Soft SF, as they call it. I found it much more interesting.

Using a computer for rituals may seem paradoxical, but you work with what you have. When I started making this music, I realized analog tools cost more. For those from middle-class backgrounds, computers are accessible, but the ritual doesn’t have to be tech-based.

The first Freemasons were doing their rituals with chalk. There wasn’t even an object. They painted the object with chalk on the ground—and that’s it. That’s the ritual. What needs to be understood is the meaning behind the symbols. Once you integrate this into yourself, then in any case – during war, during really hard times – you can recreate this ritual with other people using your imagination alone. The ritual superimposes pretty much anything, be it hard technology or non-technical layers.

NM: It’s adaptable. A soft technology.

RL: And unreadable by capital. Whatever material condition you are in, you can still manage to practice it.

And you can’t practice it if there is nobody else in the room. There is a lot of personal ritual, self-care advertising out there, but I don’t think that qualifies. There has to be a common sense of what is going on, and that common sense is creating a community. Then, through that circuit of common knowledge, you can circulate your values, exchange them and create an independent society from it.

HL: Technology is inseparable from contemporary life. That’s precisely why we deliberately bring it into parts of our performances. On stage, we don’t use technology as an extension of the self. We use it to evoke the struggle against the way it tries to shape us into its systems of measurement.

For me, those moments are a practice of bracketing the speed and efficiency of technology, in order to return, for a moment, to the body.

I picked up this book on ancient magic because I’m interested in why people choose particular objects, and how, in a pre-rational era, those objects came to exceed their practical or decorative roles and shape everyday spiritual life. I feel something similar in my choreography. A costume or prop is never just decoration; it powerfully alters my movement and presence. The symbolism in our shows isn’t so much there to explain a message as to recondition the body in space, redirect the flow of movement and posture, and create a different state of being.

NM: What was your first contact with ritual?

HL: My grandmother’s funeral.

During Japanese funerals, the family spends the final night in the same room as the deceased, watching through the night to ensure that the candles and incense never go out. No one speaks; they simply continue to share the space together. The air feels slightly cold, and time seems to move differently than usual. When sounds fade in the middle of the night, breathing becomes more noticeable, and the body quiets itself. Without words, you think of the deceased. Everyone’s attention gathers there. It felt like a particular ‘shape of time’ meant to allow the acceptance of loss.

NM: To what extent does the illusion of ritual enactment really exist in the world? And how does that change you? How do you hope it changes the audience?

HL: I hope it would be like after seeing an inspiring movie, staying with you aesthetically and emotionally. It changes you, digs deep inside you and then something else comes as a result.

RL: Which is something you experienced as a child as well, right? When you’re creating the world as you go through it, it influences your decisions before they solidify into a specific form.

Before thinking of our performances as a very serious concert, when we do them in a club, some audiences can be rude, but it’s really fun because a lot of people are ready to dive super deep into what’s behind the show, their own interpretations, and so on. That’s a real-life aspect of this illusion being more than just a moment in time on stage.

HL: But I feel it’s not really measurable; there isn’t a sense of completion to look forward to in illusion.

Just the fact that this moment existed for people during the performance is precious enough. Most likely, some people will encounter echoes of this moment, either on that same night or years later.

I don’t expect the audience to understand something specific or to change. I think it’s enough if the sense of having coexisted in that space remains, without turning into words. I try to incorporate actions that dissolve the boundary between the stage, the symbolism and the audience during the performance. Depending on the night’s vibes, it sometimes works and sometimes doesn’t. A recent performance we had in Manchester had this feeling of gentle merging. After the show, a kid approached me, visibly emotional and simply said, “I was moved.” This is when you know it worked.

RL: The moment in history we’re living through is really a recognition that fiction has been shaping our society in deeper ways than we thought. Cyberpunk offers us only one vision of an inescapable dystopian future, and tech billionaires love it. We need to build alternative choices carefully because they’re self-determining. There is an apparatus of control managed with fictions. And we cannot just say, “Ah, it’s affect. It doesn’t relate to dialectical materialism.” It affects people and their adherence to an ideology. Some fictions are destructive. Terminator, The Matrix, or cyberpunk Blade Runner aesthetics are surely good, but within that is a kind of dystopian pornography.

I recently discovered ‘arcology’, a synthesis of architecture and ecology as the philosophy of democratic society, an idea developed by Paolo Soleri. I’ve been trying to develop my architectural knowledge and looking at similar approaches, such as Pascal Häusermann’s modular habitats in the forest. It was interesting to see how space can completely change how a society functions.

NM: When it comes to music, performance and movement, to what extent is it important that people comprehend the force behind it all, the theoretical or even just the emotive background of what you guys are trying to do?

HL/RL: It’s not important to us.

RL: It’s much more important to convey emotions in the moment. The truth is, when you make music or when you decide which choreography or which ritual to perform, there is always the (distinct) moment of actually starting to do it. If you are aware of the process when it happens, there is always a little snap. You black out. You enter a black box where nothing is in control. I could get academic, but for most people, that’s not the point. It’s more spontaneous. That spontaneity betrays the concept you’ve been preparing in your head.

When I was working in my [Freemason] lodge on the use of ritual, I initially assumed that modern rationality and science had made rituals — and magical thinking and superstitions — disappear. I later realised that rituals aren’t primarily magical or superstitious customs, but are rather synergetic protocols within communities, helping them to become more than the sum of their parts. It might seem counterintuitive, but I think beliefs and superstitions are interchangeable components of rituals, not their foundation.

I have little in common with my neighbor, yet we share a minimal set of ritual practices: solstitial ceremonies, knowing the proper dance movements for matsuri and so on. What is truly eroding ritual is capitalism’s encoding and commodification of social life. Which is, to some degree, intentional, aiming to produce a society of individuals rather than communities. Even the mall, one of the saddest forms of communal sub-ritual, is being replaced by delivery apps and warehouses. People are becoming strangers to one another, leaving them vulnerable to oppression and increasing dependence on techno-capital.

HL: For me as well, intellectual understanding is not important. Understanding may come later, or it may not come at all. If someone wants to know more, they can explore it themselves and make it their own. Wherever you live, spontaneous movements and rhythms can emerge, gradually expanding into larger circles until they reach a ritualistic state. The narrative or belief system is often formed and expressed afterwards, sometimes with little or no connection to the initial impulse.

NM: Since you are operating on intuition, how has that intuition changed over the years? How is it especially different on Mythoplaxy?

RL: What other people do impacts me now—openly. I like to be close to people whose work I actually appreciate. And I’m completely okay with being influenced. But also, I’m less and less obsessed with seeing a single narrative. Especially after this album. I’m thinking more and more about architecture right now, about spaces and sound as spaces. If you compare this with our first EP, which was recorded in a tiny space. It’s isolated, almost claustrophobic. Mythoplaxy is a bit more free-roaming, which is pretty logical given our travel.

HL: Our early stuff was less ritualistic and more focused on having a catharsis on stage because it was relating to sexual abuse. It was scripted, but very lightly, a minimal script creating the space to release emotions. Now, I’m more focused on creating a space in itself through movement and undulation, rather than being the main character.

It’s less about displaying raw personal emotions and struggles to an audience, and more about projecting both the audience and ourselves into the future, imagining alternative times and places where things could be better for everyone—narrative territories where dreaming of a better future becomes possible again, even if these projections are not escapist and fully acknowledge that they would take shape in the ruins of a world order that has failed.

RL: The idea is to create a space, and if possible, to give the audience a sense that they are part of this space. And you’re part of the audience while you are creating the thing, which works differently depending on the space you’re in. So we’re more careful about where we accept to play and under which conditions.

NM: The way I would read that is going from individuation to indivisibility.

RL: That’s the way I feel. I think Nami is the same. Moving from being an individual to being a part of everything.

Natalie Mariko is the author of HATE POEMS (no more poetry, AUS 2023), managing editor of the annual arts, sciences and fashion magazine CODE and a junior contributing writer for CLOT.

The Absurdity and Authoritarianism of Now: My Chemical Romance’s The Black Parade Resonates Queerly, Anew

My Chemical Romance fans are speculating about new music after the band wiped their X account clean and wrapped up the Latin America leg of their tour this month. Whether another album is on the way or not, MCR’s magnum opus – The Black Parade – continues to endure two decades later. The sound now resonates through MCR’s commentary on fascism, critiquing the nation while holding the crowd accountable for our participation or passivity.

As the band tours The Black Parade for its 20th anniversary, the members have rejected nostalgia in favor of a new storyline, playing alter-ego characters who have been conditioned to perform for a dictator. The plot, slightly shifting night to night, encourages fans to follow along.

In the first run of the tour, each concert paused midway for an “election.” Four hooded figures walked out to the center stage. Nearby, an army official watched. Singer Gerard Way asked the audience to vote: Support these candidates or reject them? Each person in the crowd had a sign. One side: YEA. The other side: NAY.

“Now we need to hear you,” Way says. The audience roars, jeering and cheering.

No matter the spectators’ will, the result is the same: execution.

The warped election – and the sound of The Black Parade – reflects the absurdism of authoritarianism. Here is a democracy that ends in death, regardless of how you vote. Viewers log into livestreams to watch the fanfare repeat.

MCR’s commentary echoes the ramping authoritarianism and upheaval in the United States:

This list represents a fraction of stories and executive orders in 2025; a “flood the zone” strategy overwhelmed the news cycle. Despite censorship efforts – such as the federal defunding of NPR and PBS – much of this information is available to us at the click of a button. State-sanctioned propaganda even encourages the spectacle. Just take a look at footage of ICE raids on the WhiteHouse’s TikTok account, set to songs and images of pop stars:

@whitehouse

PSA: If you’re a criminal illegal, you WILL be arrested & deported. ✨

♬ original sound – The White House

Yet fatigue and fearmongering keep many complacent; looming economic crises also draw our attention and time. I do not mean to diminish people’s efforts of resistance. But I am interested in the way technology has expanded our potential to witness violence, without ever requiring us to act – as well as the power of entertainment to distract.

So I turn back to MCR’s spectacle, which twists and mirrors this descent into fascism. Up against the tour’s faux-executions, the boos and the cheers of the crowd collapse into a cacophony. I locate the sound of our times within these screams, where dissent seems to go unheard and melds into the chorus of support.

The Black Parade is full of these bombastic wails, but the most intense of them are in “Mama,” a song that balloons into an extended eight-minute performance in the Long Live the Black Parade Tour. Within “Mama,” I try to make some sense of these screams, finding queer resonance with the present moment.

With my analysis, I ask: How might we hold fascist figures to account without squirming out of our own role in the daily exchange of authoritarianism? I argue My Chemical Romance’s 2025-2026 performance of “Mama” highlights structures of violence but also criticizes our participation within them.

In “Mama,” the indulgence of sin is contagious. It’s loud. It’s repeated: “Mama, we all go to hell.” This refrain, set to a polka beat, creates an abject intimacy around our shared fate. Queer listeners have interpreted this song as an angry anthem against the rejection we face from our families and dogmatic religion. For those of us who have heard, “You’re going to hell,” the response, “We all go to hell,” serves as a relief. Verses like “You should’ve raised a baby girl, I should’ve been a better son” have been reclaimed by transgender fans.

Other fans have taken issue with these interpretations, arguing queer attachments distract from the “true” meaning of the song. Indeed, “Mama” tells the story of a soldier writing from the trenches of war, while his mother judges him from afar. But I argue that by placing a queer reading in tandem with the canonical narrative, generative meanings emerge. Queer theory provides tools to understand the role of the mother here. Mama is the title of the song. Mama is pervasive. Mama is mean. Mama is on his mind. But she is also almost entirely absent, avoiding accountability for her son’s violence and instead blaming him: “She said, ‘You ain’t no son of mine.’”

The soldier finds that the trenches are not just his domain, but also his mama’s: “Mama, we’re all full of lies…And right now, they’re building a coffin your size.” His plea to his mother helps us wonder: What about the culture that birthed this violence? In this metaphor, critiquing the mother extends to critiquing the nation.

At the climax of the song, these sentiments come through screams: 30 seconds of an extended, “AHHHHHH” and a crying out of, “Mama, Mama, Mama.” In these wails, I find a soldier begging to share responsibility with his motherland, even as he contends with his own role in the violence. The cries puncture the polka, demonstrating “Mama” is not a celebration, after all.

Mama only sings one line back, through the voice of theater icon Liza Minnelli: “And if you would call me a sweetheart/I’d maybe then sing you a song.” Minnelli’s voice connects the song’s sound to her role in Cabaret, a musical which mixes together queer aesthetics and indulgent decadence with a foreboding rise of fascism. This allusion to Cabaret, as well as the tour performance, serve as a reminder: pleasure and entertainment does not always equal resistance.

In the extended version of “Mama” on tour, these lines are sung by an opera singer, whose voice, too, serves the dictator. Preceding her performance, the song briefly opens up a space for resistance. A new section of the song, debuted on the tour, includes the lyrics:

A dagger, a dagger

Please fetch me a dagger

A tool for our treasonous needs…

With tears in our eyes we collapse on the crosses

And said death be the son of us all

This war is the son of us all.

Even as Gerard Way’s character plots treason against the dictator, these new lyrics make clear: this “death” and “war” is “the son of us all.” Though we might want to pin fascism on one figure, many Americans have participated in the creation of this “death/war.” There are fatal consequences for our collective actions – or our passivity.

Ultimately, the dramatics of this song, delivered like a sinister weapon, critique violence, while ironically trapping us in its pleasures. If prayer is crying out to our father who art in heaven, “Mama” is yelling back at our mother to bring her to where she belongs: the hell in which we both exist. Given the stakes of our political moment, I argue we need to scream louder, with purpose and strategy, against our motherland.

Featured Image: “My Chemical Romance Live at T-Mobile Park 6/11/25,” Image by Flickr User Laura Smith CC BY-ND 4.0

Max Lubbers (he/she) is a first-year PhD student in the American Studies and Ethnicity department at the University of Southern California. His research centers on transgender affects and sounds. Max earned a bachelor’s degree in Journalism and Gender and Sexuality Studies from Northwestern University, with a senior thesis on butch affect. She previously worked as a journalist, with pieces in Chicago’s NPR station, Colorado Public Radio, and Windy City Times.

REWIND!…If you liked this post, check out:

The Sounds of Equality: Reciting Resilience, Singing Revolutions–Mukesh Kulriya

Vocal Anguish, Disinformation, and the Politics of Eurovision 2016–Maria Sonevytsky

“To Unprotect and Subserve:” King Britt Samples the Sonic Archive of Police Violence Alex Werth

The Absurdity and Authoritarianism of Now: My Chemical Romance’s The Black Parade Resonates Queerly, Anew

My Chemical Romance fans are speculating about new music after the band wiped their X account clean and wrapped up the Latin America leg of their tour this month. Whether another album is on the way or not, MCR’s magnum opus – The Black Parade – continues to endure two decades later. The sound now resonates through MCR’s commentary on fascism, critiquing the nation while holding the crowd accountable for our participation or passivity.

As the band tours The Black Parade for its 20th anniversary, the members have rejected nostalgia in favor of a new storyline, playing alter-ego characters who have been conditioned to perform for a dictator. The plot, slightly shifting night to night, encourages fans to follow along.

In the first run of the tour, each concert paused midway for an “election.” Four hooded figures walked out to the center stage. Nearby, an army official watched. Singer Gerard Way asked the audience to vote: Support these candidates or reject them? Each person in the crowd had a sign. One side: YEA. The other side: NAY.

“Now we need to hear you,” Way says. The audience roars, jeering and cheering.

No matter the spectators’ will, the result is the same: execution.

The warped election – and the sound of The Black Parade – reflects the absurdism of authoritarianism. Here is a democracy that ends in death, regardless of how you vote. Viewers log into livestreams to watch the fanfare repeat.

MCR’s commentary echoes the ramping authoritarianism and upheaval in the United States:

This list represents a fraction of stories and executive orders in 2025; a “flood the zone” strategy overwhelmed the news cycle. Despite censorship efforts – such as the federal defunding of NPR and PBS – much of this information is available to us at the click of a button. State-sanctioned propaganda even encourages the spectacle. Just take a look at footage of ICE raids on the WhiteHouse’s TikTok account, set to songs and images of pop stars:

@whitehouse

PSA: If you’re a criminal illegal, you WILL be arrested & deported. ✨

♬ original sound – The White House

Yet fatigue and fearmongering keep many complacent; looming economic crises also draw our attention and time. I do not mean to diminish people’s efforts of resistance. But I am interested in the way technology has expanded our potential to witness violence, without ever requiring us to act – as well as the power of entertainment to distract.

So I turn back to MCR’s spectacle, which twists and mirrors this descent into fascism. Up against the tour’s faux-executions, the boos and the cheers of the crowd collapse into a cacophony. I locate the sound of our times within these screams, where dissent seems to go unheard and melds into the chorus of support.

The Black Parade is full of these bombastic wails, but the most intense of them are in “Mama,” a song that balloons into an extended eight-minute performance in the Long Live the Black Parade Tour. Within “Mama,” I try to make some sense of these screams, finding queer resonance with the present moment.

With my analysis, I ask: How might we hold fascist figures to account without squirming out of our own role in the daily exchange of authoritarianism? I argue My Chemical Romance’s 2025-2026 performance of “Mama” highlights structures of violence but also criticizes our participation within them.

In “Mama,” the indulgence of sin is contagious. It’s loud. It’s repeated: “Mama, we all go to hell.” This refrain, set to a polka beat, creates an abject intimacy around our shared fate. Queer listeners have interpreted this song as an angry anthem against the rejection we face from our families and dogmatic religion. For those of us who have heard, “You’re going to hell,” the response, “We all go to hell,” serves as a relief. Verses like “You should’ve raised a baby girl, I should’ve been a better son” have been reclaimed by transgender fans.

Other fans have taken issue with these interpretations, arguing queer attachments distract from the “true” meaning of the song. Indeed, “Mama” tells the story of a soldier writing from the trenches of war, while his mother judges him from afar. But I argue that by placing a queer reading in tandem with the canonical narrative, generative meanings emerge. Queer theory provides tools to understand the role of the mother here. Mama is the title of the song. Mama is pervasive. Mama is mean. Mama is on his mind. But she is also almost entirely absent, avoiding accountability for her son’s violence and instead blaming him: “She said, ‘You ain’t no son of mine.’”

The soldier finds that the trenches are not just his domain, but also his mama’s: “Mama, we’re all full of lies…And right now, they’re building a coffin your size.” His plea to his mother helps us wonder: What about the culture that birthed this violence? In this metaphor, critiquing the mother extends to critiquing the nation.

At the climax of the song, these sentiments come through screams: 30 seconds of an extended, “AHHHHHH” and a crying out of, “Mama, Mama, Mama.” In these wails, I find a soldier begging to share responsibility with his motherland, even as he contends with his own role in the violence. The cries puncture the polka, demonstrating “Mama” is not a celebration, after all.

Mama only sings one line back, through the voice of theater icon Liza Minnelli: “And if you would call me a sweetheart/I’d maybe then sing you a song.” Minnelli’s voice connects the song’s sound to her role in Cabaret, a musical which mixes together queer aesthetics and indulgent decadence with a foreboding rise of fascism. This allusion to Cabaret, as well as the tour performance, serve as a reminder: pleasure and entertainment does not always equal resistance.

In the extended version of “Mama” on tour, these lines are sung by an opera singer, whose voice, too, serves the dictator. Preceding her performance, the song briefly opens up a space for resistance. A new section of the song, debuted on the tour, includes the lyrics:

A dagger, a dagger

Please fetch me a dagger

A tool for our treasonous needs…

With tears in our eyes we collapse on the crosses

And said death be the son of us all

This war is the son of us all.

Even as Gerard Way’s character plots treason against the dictator, these new lyrics make clear: this “death” and “war” is “the son of us all.” Though we might want to pin fascism on one figure, many Americans have participated in the creation of this “death/war.” There are fatal consequences for our collective actions – or our passivity.

Ultimately, the dramatics of this song, delivered like a sinister weapon, critique violence, while ironically trapping us in its pleasures. If prayer is crying out to our father who art in heaven, “Mama” is yelling back at our mother to bring her to where she belongs: the hell in which we both exist. Given the stakes of our political moment, I argue we need to scream louder, with purpose and strategy, against our motherland.

Featured Image: “My Chemical Romance Live at T-Mobile Park 6/11/25,” Image by Flickr User Laura Smith CC BY-ND 4.0

Max Lubbers (he/she) is a first-year PhD student in the American Studies and Ethnicity department at the University of Southern California. His research centers on transgender affects and sounds. Max earned a bachelor’s degree in Journalism and Gender and Sexuality Studies from Northwestern University, with a senior thesis on butch affect. She previously worked as a journalist, with pieces in Chicago’s NPR station, Colorado Public Radio, and Windy City Times.

REWIND!…If you liked this post, check out:

The Sounds of Equality: Reciting Resilience, Singing Revolutions–Mukesh Kulriya

Vocal Anguish, Disinformation, and the Politics of Eurovision 2016–Maria Sonevytsky

“To Unprotect and Subserve:” King Britt Samples the Sonic Archive of Police Violence Alex Werth

Digital Tribulations 10: The Quest for Indigenous Digital Sovereignty in the Amazon

Interview with Jader Gama. 

The introduction of Digital Tribulations, a series of intellectual interviews on the developments of digital sovereignty in Latin America, can be read here.

As I write these words of introduction, I cannot help but feel a profound saudade for my time in the Amazon with Gama. I arrived in Belém the week after COP30 had ended, just as prices were returning to normal. I have always been drawn to places not yet uniformed by the dictates of capital and consumer culture—like rural India—and the Amazon is one of them. Stripped of the myths and exotic fantasies that so often reach the Global North, I found a place that felt radically different, yet deeply welcoming and unexpectedly familiar.

The port of Belem.

Let’s begin with the food. A variety of long, white-fleshed fish I had never heard of, pulled from river waters sixty meters deep. And then açaí, the fruit of a local palm with extraordinary antioxidant properties, which has long been the staple of the regional diet. Because it spoils so quickly, it is usually exported as frozen pulp for ice cream; here, however, it is eaten fresh in a bowl. It looks like thick purple yogurt but tastes earthy and bitter, and it is served with sugar and small pearls of tapioca. Life, it seems, revolves around açaí: you quickly become addicted to it, as it accompanies literally any meal. In the morning, you must buy it early before it runs out, and you learn to look for the grossa (beware of vendors who dilute it with water!). If a restaurant runs out of it, people react with the stunned gaze one reserves for when a basic human right is missing.

The acai ready to be delivered.

The acai ready to be consumed.

After spending a few days in a hostel in Belém and then on the island of Cotijuba, a tropical paradise with a painful history as a former site of incarceration and slavery, I went to visit Gama at his home on the island of São João do Outeiro (Ilha de Caratateua). I had received his contact from Flynn, a friend in São Paulo. From the very first moment, Gama was extraordinarily kind. He invited me to lunch with his family—fried tucunaré and açaí—and I gave him a copy of my book. I spent the night at his place, browsing his library and resting in a hammock, an essential fixture of Amazonian life.

One evening, we attended the inauguration of a terreiro of the Candomblé religion, a vibrant Afro-Brazilian faith, the result of a syncretism between various African traditions and Catholicism. For a long time, it was marginalized and persecuted; before the landmark law proposed by the writer Jorge Amado in 1946, which guaranteed religious freedom, its practices were often criminalized and dismissed as sorcery. 

Later, after spending 5 days going up the Amazon river on a boat while sleeping on a hammock, I reached Santarém, where I met Gama’s sister, Judith. She was equally generous and welcoming. We spoke at length about the myth of the boto, the pink Amazonian dolphin. In local folklore, the boto is a shapeshifter who transforms into a handsome, well-dressed man in a white hat to seduce women, often leaving them pregnant. Beyond its mystical allure, the myth has historically served as a social narrative to explain pregnancies outside of marriage or to protect the identity of fathers in the riverine society.

On the boat un the Amazon river.

I unfortunately missed the Yemanjá celebration—the great festival for the Queen of the Sea—on the beach, but we walked along the shore until we reached the astonishing Sumaúma tree, the symbol of the island. At low tide, its massive roots, the sapopemas, are exposed, creating the surreal spectacle of a giant tree that appears to float above the sand. The health of the Sumaúma depends on the richness of the soil beneath it; in a way, it embodies the very idea of terra preta, the fertile black earth created through ancestral technique, which later reappears in Gama’s project of cultivating a sovereign digital territory. 

The amazing tree of Sumaúma at Praia do Amor.

Before the interview, Gama confided in me that he enjoys taking video calls with Europe from the beach, intentionally turning on his camera at the end to provoke a little envy. He also showed me a large building on the Praia do Amor that he hopes to acquire and transform into a center for the projects we discuss in this interview. We had planned to record the interview on the sand after a swim, but the wind was too strong for proper audio. Instead, we sat at his table and began discussing indigenous digital sovereignty and the digital citizenship initiatives he is involved in. 

What I found particularly intriguing throughout our conversations is how counter-colonial and indigenous thinkers like Nego Bispo, with notions such as the colonization of the imaginary, intersect with continental philosophy of technology. Concepts like technical alienation, which Gama mobilizes in dialogue with Paulo Freire and Álvaro Vieira Pinto, are integrated with Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation and technical objects. Here the struggle for digital sovereignty, from being framed as a technical or infrastructural problem, becomes cultural, epistemic, and ontological: a question of how to cultivate a digital territory rooted in ancestral knowledge while engaging critically with global technological systems.

It is from that table, with the sound of the wind still echoing in the background and the sea only a few metres away, that the interview begins.

***

What is your trajectory and why are you interested in digital sovereignty?

I was always raised near the river. I was born in a city called Santarém, which is a city located halfway between Belém and Manaus. I like to say it is the oldest city in the Amazon, which even before colonization was a great center of culture and economy in the region. A crossroads of rivers: three great rivers meet there, the Arapiuns, the Tapajós, and the Amazonas. Arapiun and Tapajó are names of indigenous peoples, and Amazonas is a colonized name they gave to this river that cuts through the entire great Pindoramic basin, today called the Amazonian basin.

I have always studied in public schools. I did my undergraduate degree at a public university in data processing and a specialization in technologies in education. My training is grounded in the construction of critical thinking. When I arrived at the university, I began to encounter technology and started thinking about it as: for what and for whom? I ended up seeking an interdisciplinary path because I saw that just the digital technology part, the engineering, did not answer social or economic problems. Later, I went to study development planning. My master’s degree was at the Núcleo de Altos Estudos Amazônicos [Center for Advanced Amazonian Studies] of the UFPA, here in Belém.

My doctorate was also at this same center. However, I changed my research line: I went to study economy and regional development. While in my master’s I studied public transparency, social participation, and electronic government, I then went on to study surveillance capitalism, data colonialism, and the knowledge economy. Now I am doing a post-doctorate that mixes a bit of all this, from the perspective of a project for territorial governance oriented toward data and traditional wisdom. It is a step toward that.

A book from Gama’s library.

Digital sovereignty is a contested word: what is the best sense, the sense that you use?

I have debated this concept of sovereignty for a long time, from a perspective of autonomy and, primarily, counter-colonization. Sovereignty is very much a term from political science. It is a term of world geopolitics. For a country to be sovereign, it must have territory, people, and the power of command—the power to use violence to maintain peace. There are many problems regarding this because, as much as it is said that Brazil is a sovereign country, Brazil is a country trapped in a dependency on the Global North. Now it is somewhat seeking, from the perspective of this multipolarity, a path toward China. But even so, from my point of view, it is a process of dependency.

But, as an Amazonian inhabitant and having contact with comunidades ribeirinhas [riverside communities], quilombolas [descendants of escaped enslaved people], indigenous and ancestral peoples, I seek to think of sovereignty starting from a technical autonomy grounded in the territory. So, the peoples I mentioned to you just now—the Tupaiu people, who are from the Tapajós community, the Arapiuns people—they have sovereignty in their territory because they are the local populations. Even though they are under the Brazilian State, they are populations and have sovereignty over their territory. So much so that when you demarcate an indigenous area, you are giving power to those people to self-determine in that territory. For me, this issue of sovereignty is closely linked to the capacity that peoples and ancestral communities have to self-determine in the territory where they act. It is this perspective that I seek to be inspired by.

For me, this issue is very important because while my colleagues speak of an origin of technology with the arrival of computers, the internet, and data processing, I prefer to think from the perspective of the origin of técnica [technique/craft], of how the populations that lived here developed techniques adapted to their cultures to solve their daily problems. This issue of inspiration in ancestral technique, for us to think about the digital today, leads me to think of a perspective of a digital sovereignty situated and grounded in the territory.

What projects are being developed here in this sense?

First, I want to tell you about the context, because that is where the projects begin for me. I started this whole story back in Santarém; I am one of the founders of a collective called Puraqué. The puraquê is an electric fish from the Amazon, an eel, a one-and-a-half-meter eel capable of knocking down an ox, paralyzing an alligator, or killing a person. According to biologists, it is a kind of environmental thermometer. Where the ecosystem is preserved, it inhabits. When this system begins to suffer environmental impacts, it is one of the first animals to disappear, to go elsewhere.

I participated in a group called GAEPA, which is the Grupo de Adolescentes Estudando o Pará [Group of Adolescents Studying Pará]. It was formed within the ideological, philosophical, and religious principles of base ecclesial communities, which worked from what became known as Liberation Theology. I was raised within this environment of popular organization. I participated in children’s groups, adolescent groups, and youth groups. I was mentored by a religious woman named Eunice Sena and a religious man named Leon Kenneth Bruni, an American. It was with them that I began to have access to reading, to learn what geopolitics, capitalism, communism, and socialism are. I began to study the life of Jesus Christ and see how there would only be an opportunity to transform my reality through unity in the territory where I lived.

We did many projects at that time. The issue of Eco 92 was very strong. Just as this COP 30 thing is present now, at the time of Eco 92 we gave lectures in schools, and one of the emblematic things we did was an environmental preservation campaign for a lake near the community where we lived. This woman and this priest were among the first people to have electronic typewriters. The first notebook I saw in my life was at their house. They had an office for project development and research typing called Puraqué.

One of my friends who participated in this group died in childbirth. The daughter survived, but she had eclampsia and passed away. That was a profound shock to our community. Her brother, who is a very close friend of mine, decided to return from Manaus to Santarém and was trying to find a new direction. It was in this context of grief and collective reorganization that the idea arose to transform our indignation into action. I said to him: “Let’s do a digital citizenship and digital inclusion project here in the neighborhood.” We lived in a territory marked by conflicts between adolescents, gangs, and violent disputes. The proposal was to create a space for training and belonging. We started assembling meta-recycled computers, true Frankensteins made from reused parts, and structuring computer rooms in the early 2000s. There, a process of digital literacy and digital culture was born that was, at the same time, technological re-appropriation and community reconstruction.

The Puraqué project became very well known in the city. We started spreading it to other cities in the Lower Amazon: Alenquer, Óbidos, Oriximiná. We began taking these initiatives to those places. When Gilberto Gil became Minister of Culture, he created a project called Digital Culture Action. I had a friend from Santarém who was married to the current Minister of Health of Brazil, Alexandre Padilha. She was very well-connected and said: “There’s going to be a meeting in Belém, a meeting of free knowledge, and I want you to come to meet people from a new project that is starting.” I went to this meeting, Tarcísio and I—this friend with whom we created Puraqué. When we arrived here, those people who were in the national debate experienced a recognition between us: what they were doing, we were also doing in some way back in Santarém. But it was something very endogenous because there was no internet like there is today. So we created our own êmicos emic, internal concepts regarding digital culture.

We didn’t call it a telecenter or an infocenter. We called it a lake, a “digital lake,” which was where the puraquês, the fish, were. And we worked with meta-recycling and environmental issues. There was a project called Reciclique as well, where people did selective waste collection. I gave an interview at this meeting. The meeting had workshops on shared management, audio-video editing, electronic publishing, and installing operating systems, all with free software. In this interview, the person who interviewed me needed to make a presentation to the Minister of Culture, evaluating the first semester of the project. He put together a 15-minute video and included a clip of me speaking for about a minute. I only spoke for a minute, but I said a lot. In the end, Gilberto Gil liked it very much and said: “And that boy from the Amazon, is he on our team yet?” The coordinator, Cláudio Prado, replied: “Not yet, but he will be.” A few days later he called me. We spent about four hours on the phone, with him wanting me to work with them. I asked: “Yes, Cláudio, but effectively, what do you want me to do?” And he said: “I want you to keep doing what you’re doing. Only now I’m going to pay you.” And so I joined the Ação Cultura Digital.

I started organizing free knowledge meetings here in the Amazon. But people from the South and Southeast were coming to do the workshops here in the Amazon. A friend of mine who coordinated the Ação Cultura Digital, named Chico Caminatti, got into a master’s program and had to leave the coordination. The team came to me and said they wanted me to coordinate the action here in the Amazon. I replied that I needed to assemble my own team, with people from here. Because it makes no sense for us to keep spending money bringing people from São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, or Rio de Janeiro here to do the training if the people here were already qualified to do it too.

I took all the people from Puraqué who worked with me and we formed the team; there were about eight people. We started doing these trainings in the Amazon, and we became the main reference in the Amazon for this thing of hacktivism, digital culture, and free software. Today, Puraqué no longer has the effectiveness it once had because, during the Dilma government, we realized there would no longer be government funding for these actions. We thought that the only place where people like us would thrive would be in universities. So we all went to do master’s and doctorates. In fact, from that group, there are three doctors and four masters. Everyone did their undergraduate degrees. Today we are somewhat like this: we meet to think about strategies and things, but Puraqué no longer effectively exists as a physical collective. But it is on the platform.

What is happening now here is a project called Terra Preta Digital [Digital Black Soil]. Terra Preta Digital is an initiative I thought in partnership with Guilherme Gitahy, and today it conducts digital citizenship training in the states of Amazonas, Roraima, Amapá, and Pará. These meetings are spaces for animation, mobilization, and training, and are part of a methodology built by many hands, with important contributions from partners like Luiz Sanches, especially in structuring the ecosystem of digital platforms, and Nara Pessoa, who plays a fundamental role in the digital citizenship meetings linked to Infovia 02. We developed a methodology based on virtual welcoming meetings, face-to-face meetings, and remote training, articulating technology, community organization, and popular education.

In this project, we created the Ecossistema Terra Preta [Terra Preta Ecosystem], inspired by the ancestral technique of cultivating what anthropologists and archaeologists call Indian black earth, a millenary technique created by the peoples who lived in this territory for soil enrichment and forest cultivation. This black earth does not occur only naturally: it is a direct result of the interaction between humans and the environment. Where there was intense and careful human action, a very rich black soil emerged which, according to biologists, houses some of the highest biodiversity indices on the planet.

This work also dialogues with the implementation of the programa Norte Conectado [Connected North program], conducted by the EAF—the state company responsible for installing sub-fluvial fiber optic cables that will bring high-speed internet to 92 cities along the Amazon riverbed. From my point of view, it is currently the main digital sovereignty project underway in Latin America, as it creates the material infrastructure necessary for local technological autonomy initiatives to flourish.

Inspired by the thought of Nego Bispo, a philosopher from here, regarding the category he created of counter-coloniality and the perspective of counter-colonization of the imaginary, we thought: just as our ancestors, thousands of years ago, created a technique to cultivate the territory, to organize the territory, we are in a historical moment where we need, in defense of our autonomy and the sovereignty of our bodies and our territory, to also cultivate our own digital territory. The way we are finding to cultivate this digital territory in a sovereign and interdependent way—because free software is that, participating in a global community—is to cultivate platforms for the organization of popular movements in the Amazon.

We have a PeerTube, called tvterrapreta.org.br. We have a WordPress that creates sites for organizations, terrapreta.org. We have an audio streaming system for setting up web radios, radio.terrapreta.org, where today we have 10 web radios in the Amazon, and our idea is to increase that. We are also starting a space called viveiro.terrapreta.org.br, which is a Nextcloud, a “drive” to organize our information, files, and the information flow of the project, so that each person on the team knows what everyone else is doing.

Additionally, we have a partnership with the Coletivo Digital from São Paulo, where we use a Jitsi instance called rede.sasikse.jitsi/terrapreta, which is our videoconferencing tool for virtual meetings.

Are digital platforms being developed here?

Yes, because these actions are organized within a space of collaborative governance, a common good that was also developed by us, not in this project, but in the previous project, called Plantaformas.org. Plantaformas is a platform for popular organization, aimed at movements, collectives, organizations, research groups, and also government organizations, as a space for the exchange of collectives, the sharing of experiences, the construction of common projects, and the organization of the work of these entities.

You can organize your meetings, encounters, conduct polls, research, and account for projects. The platform, I would say, is the communicative backbone of these initiatives, and it is similar to Decidim in Barcelona. Today, our main project underway is this. From Terra Preta, we held a meeting here on the Ilha de Caratateua, which was the 4th Digital Citizenship Meeting. From the meeting of forty-some organizations from this territory, a Forum for Innovation, Technology, and Culture of the insular region emerged.

I am also doing work on articulation and fundraising because our idea is to create a technological pole here on the island. Today it is basically that. Beyond my activism and my academic life, I also have a company, Nomade Tecnologias, specialized in the implementation of these platforms. Our focus is really on Decidim and Liane, which is another digital marketing tool that uses Meta’s API for data collection and organization of information, campaigns, and political mobilization movements.

Are there specificities of Big Tech colonization here in the Amazon? Is it different from the rest of Brazil?

I don’t think so. I don’t think it’s different from Brazil, or Europe, or anywhere in the world, because, from the point of view of domination, we are all in a process of colonization. Now, here there is a specific aspect. And I won’t even talk about digital addiction or gambling addiction. I won’t even talk about an aspect that everyone knows: that we are under a system, a business that is based on capturing people’s attention and data.

But the impact it has here in the Amazon is, for me, from the perspective of environmental colonization. This is a differentiating point that occurs in the Pan-Amazon and also in Africa, because of the dispute over critical minerals, rare earths, but mainly lithium—lithium in Bolivia and gold in the Amazon. Gold is also at the base of the world’s technology chain.

Another aspect that draws attention, regarding the actions of Big Techs in the Amazon, is the use of digital infrastructures that end up being appropriated by networks linked to environmental crimes—illegal miners, loggers, land grabbers—who use, for example, low-orbit satellites to communicate and organize their strategies.

There is also the process of cognitive plunder related to the biological data of the beings of the Amazon. There is a very well-constructed process of plundering biological data and knowledge from the Amazon, often camouflaged in the form of “international cooperation.” The amount of projects here collecting data on the plant and animal life of the Amazon is very large. This resource that comes from these Big Techs, which comes from the Global North, is very rooted in the higher education institutions of the Amazon. So it is the same process of manipulation, modulation, technical alienation, and cognitive and data plundering that is normally used anywhere else in the world, but here it has a special aggravating factor. Why? This data should be safeguarded.

This information, this knowledge, this saber about the Amazon, has the safeguard of ancestral peoples. And you see a process of biological data plundering and cognitive plunder without any benefit for these populations. This is also a differentiator of this face of data colonialism, of Big Techs acting here in the Amazon. At COP30 you saw this in a very blatant way.

What did you think of the COP30?

A space for political, economic, and geopolitical lobbying. A space where there was little structured listening to Amazonian voices. But I think it was good because many people came here, mainly from Latin America, but at COP30 itself, we had a very limited, very small impact. For me, the Peoples’ Summit was much more interesting, where I had an active role, met many people, managed to make articulations, and I think it strengthened our network as a network of people who think, just like our ancestors, in technical systems of life generation, and not death generation.

The terra preta of the indigenous peoples was a technical system of life generation. The technique from the Global North that arrives here, which also works on the issue of productivity and food production, is a technique guided by a productivist logic that ignores life cycles, necropolitics, that will use pesticides, chemical products, genetic manipulation—in short, all that you already know, technique used for an enhancement that, as Nego Bispo would say, is synthetic.

Who is Nego Bispo?

He is a philosopher, a quilombola sage who wrote several books showing how colonialism, monoculture, and also Christianity are elements of colonization of our imaginary and end up taking away our capacity for self-determination and uprooting us from our territories. In this place where you are sitting, Nego Bispo has already sat eating piracuí, a kind of dehydrated fish flour, an ancestral technique of the peoples who lived here. Nego Bispo is one of the founding thoughts of what I told you, because he leads us to understand that, to counter-colonize our imaginary, we need to engage in a war of denominations. And what is the war of denominations? It is calling things by the name that we have, that we give. That is what I have been telling you from the beginning.

Today, Big Techs determine all relationships, including the relationships of social movements. Social movements have lost their capacity, their technical autonomy to organize, communicate, and mobilize, because today they have to adapt to the standards of Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter.

This also depends on the fact that when social networks arrived, which became famous in 2010, there was the whole narrative of emancipation—such as the Arab Spring, against powers—and decentralization, which turned out to be completely false.

A Trojan horse, right? Nego Bispo always placed himself in this position. It is a position very linked to other thinkers, like Paulo Freire, or Álvaro Vieira Pinto, who is a Brazilian philosopher of technology. He, along with Paulo Freire, created the term naive consciousness. I articulate this with the war of denominations, Nego Bispo’s counter-colonial movement, and the thought of Gilbert Simondon, where one of the categories I use most is that of technical alienation.

When you join technical alienation with naive consciousness, that is exactly what happens: the social movement, starting from this technical alienation, builds a naive consciousness and does not realize that it hands over the entire strategy, the entire form of political articulation and training of its bases to these corporations. People think this is natural. I see it as if we were in the dictatorship, with a training and study group, and an undercover Army agent came, stayed here talking to us, and captured all the information of what we are discussing.

For me, when I arrive at the debate with social movements, popular organizations, and NGOs interested in this subject, I don’t start by talking about digital sovereignty. I start by talking about information security, about information organization, about self-determination regarding data. Any serious company today does not put its knowledge inside these infrastructures. No matter how expensive it is, they pay to have sovereignty over their data. I think this is a fundamental point, and I perceive that this will, more and more, create an environment of criticality regarding digital technologies, because people are starting to become aware that there is data plundering, the sickening of the population, issues related to addictions, and how the design of these platforms determines people’s behavior.

This is my work today: through digital citizenship, digital literacy, and digital sovereignty, to lead people to understand that information is important, that the data generating this information is important, and that this information, when worked on, generates knowledge. And that this knowledge, from this collected data, can help think about improving the quality of life in the territories where we inhabit.

From my point of view, this action of critical digital literacy strengthens even community processes and democracy in local environments. I know there are many criticisms of democratic processes here in Brazil. It is terrible to see our Congress today, represented by conservative sectors strongly linked to specific economic interests. Most are clientelist and self-serving deputies who are there working for themselves and not for the people. However, I think that democracy is still the best path we can have. And only from a formation, a popular education in the territories, can we lead people to have critical thinking regarding their experience. This critical thinking can lead to the strengthening of democracy and the organization of civic movements, where we can have other types of candidates—male, female, and non-binary—who lead to political diversity in our country. As you must have noticed, we live in an environment of extremely high polarization in Brazil, as in every part of the world.

Concretely, how can platforms like Plantaformas help in popular organization?

I think the main contribution is the understanding of spaces like these as common goods. You take responsibility for that digital territory. Just like the physical territory, the digital territory demands responsibility. Another point is that these tools are more appropriate for popular organization. Today I see, for example, large-scale movements in Brazil that organize within WhatsApp groups. This tends to generate more noise than structured organization. There is a perspective of a design that helps in the organization of information, in the promotion of more direct participation, where people can send proposals, vote, document meetings, and visualize maps of their actions. I think that is a real contribution.

The other is the process of technical de-alienation. Because it needs people who understand computational infrastructure, systems analysis, software development, communication, community animation, community management, event organization, data science—it needs a large amount of saberes and knowledge. When you have this in a shared digital environment, you end up creating a culture of collaboration.

Projects have already been registered on the platform, meetings have already been held. I still don’t have a way to measure this with precision, but I am sure that, in projects alone, in these three years, at least 10 million reais have already passed through the Plantaformas, among the people who joined. For example, today we were meeting with the Irmãs da Horta [Sisters of the Garden], with the people from Slow Food, which is an international network. Plantaformas was the locus of this meeting, and whoever was absent will be able to view them. It is documented. I think that to generate trust, transparency is necessary, and the platform is a place for that.

And at the government level, what do you think of the development of public digital infrastructure in Brazil and the discourse of digital sovereignty?

Honestly speaking, either there is a structural technical alienation, or there are economic interests that hinder this debate. Because, for me, these contracts with Big Techs compromise the informational sovereignty of the country. Besides handing over the personal data of Brazilian citizens to these infrastructures, we pay billionaire contracts. This resource could be being invested in Brazil, in Brazilian companies, generating work here and, mainly, in the network of universities and federal institutes—there are more than 500 institutions, counting universities and institutes, not to mention the state ones.

There would be conditions in Brazil, even, to create a sovereign and federated network that would provide support for Latin America, because Brazil has the largest infrastructure. This network of universities would have to reinvent itself, because today the university is technically alienated, cultivating a naive consciousness regarding the knowledge economy.

In the government, in the same way. If you follow the international geopolitical debate in the last six months, the word President Lula spoke most was sovereignty. Do you know how many times he spoke about digital sovereignty? Very few. Because the theme still does not occupy the centrality it should in the government’s strategic advisory, or because there is a very heavy lobby that prevents this debate from coming to the agenda.

But this debate will come to the agenda, especially from the perspective of digital citizenship and the organization of information in the territories. I don’t believe in any other model than from the bottom up. If we can’t organize this at the base, it won’t ascend to the central infrastructure of the government, because there is no space to debate it. We have in Brazil a front for digital sovereignty. But we haven’t managed to have an impact on the federal government because the contracts are already made.

But is Pix a path to improve the situation?

Certainly, certainly. I make a point of using Pix for everything. For me, that is counter-colonial policy. But it is not seen that way: it is seen as a technical solution, not as a techno-political solution. I’ll give you an example: when you don’t politicize public policies, you end up alienating the people. There are Black people against the quota policy of federal universities, and these people graduated because they studied thanks to the quotas. When you don’t politicize public policies—when you don’t say “people, Pix is this”; when you don’t say “quotas are a historical reparation for a historical debt that this country has”—you end up creating people who form their consciousness from meritocratic thinking, believing they won in life on their own.

For me, digital policies should be politicized. Have a debate with the population, say: “People, Pix exists because American Big Techs, with every purchase you make, capture a fraction of that payment; now imagine what that represents when we are talking about billions of transactions per year. With Pix, we are going to free ourselves from part of this economic drain.” This fight between the United States and Brazil has, yes, a part of raw material plundering, cognitive plundering, biological plundering, but also the maintenance of these colonial resource suckers, like credit card corporations.

It was very good that you said that whenever a new technology comes, it appears disguised as salvation. It is fundamental to understand the intentionality of each technology because they all have interests. I think Pix is a great example that countries in the Global South have the conditions, human and technological, to create instruments of self-determination and economic and digital sovereignty, as is the case with Pix.

What are the pragmatic steps in the coming years to develop digital sovereignty? 

For me, it is about taking the debate to popular classes. It is taking advantage of the public policy of digital literacy, the computational thinking that is being implemented throughout the country, and bringing critical digital literacy to teachers. This is the main path, so that in the next 5, 10 years, we begin to change this positioning. Why? The dominant thought of the colonizer tells us, and especially the teachers, that there is only one way to do things. That is a big lie. There are other ways to do people’s digital training. There are even “unplugged” techniques, where you teach the digital without a computer and without a cell phone.

I think it is fundamental to think of strategies that bring critical thinking regarding technology to the population. Today, my neighbors here are being run over by these platforms, especially by what they call, for marketing purposes, “artificial intelligence.” They are going to be run over by this technology and won’t even know what happened because they are outside the possibility of thinking critically about the use of information technology. So, this point is fundamental to be done. Pragmatically, it is training.